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This issue provides two articles and a book review dealing with expert witnesses and their interactions with courts and judges.Our lead article, from Professor Andrew Jurs, reviews the results of sur-
veys he conducted with judges in six states. Jurs wanted to compare how judges
handled expert-witness issues in states using the traditional admissibility test of
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (adopting the general-accep-
tance standard), and in states using the factor test announced in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). As judges, we often are
unaware of whether we are in the mainstream among judges or are outliers. If
you sometimes decide whether an expert’s testi-
mony is admissible under the standards applica-
ble in your jurisdiction, we think you’ll find of
interest how judges are applying both the Frye
and Daubert standards today. 
Next, a group of researchers in the Department
of Psychology at Drexel University reviews the
use of information from third parties in psycho-
logical or psychiatric evaluations. Such informa-
tion may be used by experts in child-custody eval-
uations, evaluations of competence to stand trial,
risk assessments, civil-commitment proceedings,
and other cases. The researchers discuss limitations that experts should recog-
nize in their use of this information as well as the legal standards judges must
apply. To the extent that admissibility is determined by practice in the field, the
researchers conclude that the use of third-party information in forensic mental-
health evaluations is “strongly supported within the fields of forensic psychology
and forensic psychiatry.”
For those interested in a detailed review of forensic mental-health assessments
in legal proceedings, Judge John W. Brown and attorney Benjamin K. Hoover
review the book Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law. The review
specifically examines this book as a resource for judges.
Our issue concludes with consideration of the use of peremptory challenges
to eliminate potential jurors based on their sexual orientation. Law student Colin
Saltry considers how the standards of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
which prohibits race-based peremptory challenges, might be applied in this con-
text. 
This is the first issue with my new coeditor, Eve Brank. Eve and I welcome
your suggestions for future issues. Feel free to correspond with either or both of
us by email (sleben56@gmail.com; ebrank2@unl.edu).—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
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I stopped working as a sitting judge in December. Two weekslater, I visited my doctor, who told me my blood pressure haddropped 30 points. After some discussion, he suggested that
I no longer needed to take blood-pressure medication. The rea-
son it fell so quickly was, of course, that I had stopped the day-
to-day work of a sitting judge. Don’t mistake me, I loved my job
and miss it. But no matter how much you love sitting as a judge,
being one is demanding, isolating, and stressful. In fact, a judge’s
profession is so stressful that New Zealand has placed judges in
the high-risk job category. This level of stress can
have very negative effects on the health of judges
and their families. 
A recent study in 2010 identified 12 significant
causes of judicial stress.1 These are (1) workload;
(2) high information and documentation require-
ments; (3) awareness of the possible consequences
of judicial error; (4) inadequate lighting; (5) near-
vision stress from excessive reading; (6) high
responsibility; (7) awareness of self-insecurity due
to function and role; (8) time pressure; (9) high
demands on quality of work; (10) insufficient
technical and material equipment; (11) required
pace of work; (12) insufficient work areas. Additionally,
between 10 and 25% of the judges in the study also mentioned
excessive computer work and working beyond a normal 8-hour
day.
In spite of all of the studies showing the high level of stress,
judges as a group tend to be in denial.  As Judge Robert L.
Childers wrote in his article Even Judges Get the Blues: “Because
of the weight of public expectation, judges generally feel that
they should be perfect. Not only do they feel that they should be
fair, impartial, and make the right decision 100 percent of the
time, but the public expects this of judges as well, as do the
lawyers who practice before them. This can create undue pres-
sure for judges and, consciously or unconsciously, keep judges
from admitting or recognizing the signs of debilitating disease.”2
These different stressors impact both the judge’s job and home
life. In smaller jurisdictions, judges have no privacy. Everything
the judge does at work and at home is the subject of local gos-
sip, so when a judge experiences work or family conflicts, those
conflicts are often revealed to the entire community.
In larger jurisdictions, the media are often interested in using
a judge’s behavior or family problems to drive readership or
viewers. For example, many judges have experienced the effect
of a negative press reaction to a judicial decision. And still oth-
ers have read about a spouse or child on the front page of the
local paper merely because the person is a member of the judge’s
family.
Recognizing the health risk of judicial stress is only the first
step. A judge needs to develop ways to combat
stress. A noted expert on judicial stress, Dr. Isaiah
M. Zimmerman, has suggested this can include
(1) maintaining a close support circle of relatives
and friends who are not competitive or envious
and with whom you can engage in robust and
honest mutual appraisal and dialogue; (2) taking
initiative to engage in activities totally removed
from the legal and judicial world and to form
friendships with some of the people you will meet
in this way; (3) learning the basics of stress-man-
agement techniques so that you can work effi-
ciently but not pay too high a price for it; and (4)
periodically serving as a mentor to a new judge, so that you can
teach by example most of these points. Stress is an inherent part
of the position judges hold. But it can be understood, and its
impact can be managed to reduce health and family problems.3
As part of the AJA’s efforts at Making Better Judges®, our
entire educational program at the midyear meeting on April 24,
2015, will focus on judicial stress and its impact on judges and
their families. These education sessions will delve into the
causes of judicial stress and ways to reduce it. Please think
about joining your fellow judges in Fort Meyers, Florida, and
learning how you can manage your stress and make yourself a
better judge. And once you understand how helpful the AJA’s
educational conferences can be, perhaps you will also join us
October 4-7 at the Sheraton hotel in downtown Seattle, Wash-
ington, for our annual conference.
Once again, thank you for taking the time to read this col-
umn, and I hope you enjoy the rest of the articles in this issue
of Court Review.
President’s Column
JUDICIAL STRESS
Brian MacKenzie
Footnotes
1. Monica Silvia Ciocoiu, Mirela Cojocaru & S.V. Ciocoiu, Implica-
tions of Levels of Stress Factors in the Magistrate’s Activity, 15
ROMANIAN BIOTECHNOLOGICAL LETTERS 126 (2010), available at
http://www.rombio.eu/rbl3vol15Supplement/18.Ciocoiu%20Moni
ca.pdf.
2. Robert L. Childers, Even Judges Get the Blues, HIGHLIGHTS (ABA
Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs), Summer 2009, at
2, available at http://goo.gl/LcLH87.
3. See generally Isaiah M. Zimmerman, Helping Judges in Distress, 90
JUDICATURE 10 (2006); Isaiah M. Zimmerman, Isolation in the Judi-
cial Career, CT. REV., Winter 2009, at 10; Isaiah M. Zimmerman,
Stress: What It Does and How It Can Be Lessened, JUDGES’ J., Sum-
mer 1981, at 4.
Footnotes
1. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge
Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008)
(“[I]nsofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper
conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional
context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal
law objectives, providing a fair trial.”); Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007) (“Gross delusions stemming from a
severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a
crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality
that the punishment can serve no proper purpose. It is therefore
error to derive from Ford, and the substantive standard for
incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for com-
petency that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the pris-
oner is aware the State has identified the link between his crime
and the punishment to be inflicted.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 352, 360 (1997) (holding that state statute allowing
indefinite commitment of sexually violent predators upon a find-
ing of “mental abnormality”—a “congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that
such person is a menace to the health and safety of others”—did
not violate the due-process clause).
3. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Richard Rogers et al.,
Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally
Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 416 (2007)
(“Defense attorneys may assume that criminal defendants have
sufficient understanding of the Miranda rights and waivers based
on their educational level and extensive contacts with the crimi-
nal justice system (Rogers, 2006). The current findings question
these assumptions, at least in the case of mentally disordered
defendants. On average, defendants with the poorest understand-
ing had completed the 10th grade and had 10 prior arrests.”).
4. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006) (“[I]t is clear that no
particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process,
and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal
offenses, is substantially open to state choice. Indeed, the legiti-
macy of such choice is the more obvious when one considers the
interplay of legal concepts of mental illness or deficiency required
for an insanity defense, with the medical concepts of mental
abnormality that influence the expert opinion testimony by psy-
chologists and psychiatrists commonly introduced to support or
contest insanity claims. For medical definitions devised to justify
treatment, like legal ones devised to excuse from conventional
criminal responsibility, are subject to flux and disagreement.”).
RONALD ROESCH AND PATRICIA A. ZAPF, EDS., FORENSIC ASSESS-
MENTS IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS,
Oxford University Press, 2012, 312 pp. $100.00.
The role of the modern trial judge maintains basically a man-agerial character,1 but the tools at the judge’s disposal arecontinually evolving. To perform effectively, the judge must
draw upon an array of legal and technical resources. To this end,
Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law provides valuable
insight regarding forensic mental-health assessments from a
technical, scientific perspective. Numerous contributors submit
overviews and analyses of the various ways in which forensic
mental-health assessments are employed by the court system.
This review examines Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil
Law as a resource for the bench.
Overall, the book is well edited, with each chapter follow-
ing the structure of (1) Legal Context; (2) Forensic Mental
Health Concepts; (3) Empirical Foundations and Limits; (4)
The Evaluation; and (5) Report Writing and Testimony, mak-
ing the work congruent and easily referenced, despite the over-
all density of the volume. The work is best utilized as a refer-
ence material, not to be digested in one sitting.
The book begins by setting forth the foundations of foren-
sic mental-health assessments, helpfully defining them “as a
domain of assessments of individuals intended to assist legal
decision makers in decisions about the application of laws
requiring consideration of individuals’ mental conditions, abil-
ities, and behaviors.” The “best practices” discussion is valu-
able and instructive regarding the role of courts in determining
who is a qualified forensic mental-health expert and what con-
stitutes admissible expert testimony. Although the focus of this
chapter lies in summarizing standards of psychiatric and psy-
chological practice for attorneys and judges, it provides a
broad-ranging introduction to the topic and generally aids in
refreshing the reader’s familiarity with psychological concepts
pertaining to the law before the volume addresses the specifics
of forensic mental-health assessments.
“Part I: Criminal” contains eight chapters covering the var-
ious applications of forensic mental-health assessments in all
aspects of criminal cases, from jury selection to capital sen-
tencing. Of particular note and interest to the bench are the
chapters in this section regarding competency evaluations,
sex-offender evaluations, and capital sentencing—areas in
which science and the law are co-evolving.2 This part addi-
tionally provides a unique perspective regarding familiar crite-
ria applicable in criminal matters, for instance, the require-
ment that a waiver of Miranda be knowing and intelligent3 and
the cognitive and volitional aspects of insanity defenses.4
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5. See Brenda K. Uekert & Richard Van Duizend, Adult Guardian-
ships: A “Best Guess” National Estimate and the Momentum for
Reform, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 107–09 (2011).
6. See id.
“Part II: Civil” comprises five chapters that cover the more
limited application of forensic mental-health assessments in
relatively common civil matters. The chapters addressing
guardianship evaluations and civil commitments may be of
particular interest to practitioners and judges alike. Petitions
for the appointment of a guardian over a person suffering
under a disability and a conservator over that person’s estate
are common on the dockets of many state courts.5 There is sig-
nificant variation in such proceedings across jurisdictions,6 as
the authors of the devoted chapter recognize, but there are best
practices nevertheless applicable under the sundry statutory
constructs. The chapter lists several areas in which a guardian-
ship/conservatorship respondent may be impaired (i.e., testa-
mentary capacity, voting, marriage, automobile driving, finan-
cial transactions, independent living, and medical care) and
sets forth diagnostic measures applicable to these areas.
“Part III: Juvenile and Family” concludes the volume with
five chapters addressing forensic mental-health assessments in
civil and criminal juvenile and family proceedings. The chap-
ter addressing child-custody evaluations gives an overview of
these procedures, insight regarding the relevant mental-health
concepts, and analysis of some ethical challenges faced by
mental-health professionals conducting these assessments.
The conceptualization of reports on forensic child-custody
evaluations delineates both the intended and unintended func-
tions that these reports serve for the parties and the court.
Again, although practices vary across jurisdictions, the materi-
als in this section are worthwhile in providing an overview of
best practices and a broad understanding of these areas from
beyond the simple legal perspective.
The authors of Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil
Law admirably recite the limitations of forensic mental-health
assessments with respect to various legal concepts, while nev-
ertheless emphasizing the utility of such assessments to vari-
ous facets of the legal system. Were the reviewers to note
potential improvements for a subsequent edition, the inclusion
of proper legal citations to the cases referenced would top the
list, as the volume is written for legal professionals. This would
help to temper the strong clinical bent of the book. In a simi-
lar vein, caselaw citations would be of more use to attorneys as
a primary reference, as opposed to the numerous academic
studies supporting many of the propositions in the text. Most
attorneys and judges would not pull and critique studies but
would quickly analyze cases cited for application. References
to the DSM-5 may also prove beneficial. Finally, a glossary of
standard psychological tests and terms (forensic instruments),
as well as the uses and acceptance thereof, would be helpful for
many in the legal profession.
In sum, Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law is a
worthwhile volume, addressing psycholegal concepts as
related to forensic mental-health assessments. The ambitious
scope of the book does not detract from the detailed informa-
tion regarding the numerous areas of law to which forensic
mental-health assessments are applied, and its value lies as a
solid background and reference volume.
John W. Brown is a judge on the Circuit Court
of the City of Chesapeake, First Judicial Circuit
of Virginia. He graduated cum laude from
Methodist University, received his J.D. from the
Wake Forest University School of Law, and
earned an LL.M. in taxation from the William
& Mary School of Law. Beginning in 1974,
Judge Brown engaged in the practice of law in
Chesapeake, serving as a Commonwealth’s Attorney and private
practitioner, until he assumed the bench in 2008. He is a member
of the Executive Committee of the American Bar Association’s
National Conference of State Trial Judges.
Benjamin K. Hoover is a staff attorney for the
Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake, First
Judicial Circuit of Virginia. He graduated from
the Pennsylvania State University with distinc-
tion in 2007. He attended the University of
Richmond School of Law, where he served as
Lead Articles Editor on the Executive Board of
the Law Review and graduated magna cum
laude as a member of the Order of the Coif. Following graduation,
he clerked for the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake and the
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
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This article is an abridged and revised version of a report of the
author’s survey originally published as Gatekeeper with a Gavel: A Sur-
vey on Judicial Management of Challenges to Expert Reliability and Their
Relationship to Summary Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 325 (2014).
Footnotes
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993); see
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., con-
curring).
3. One major reason to believe courtroom standards may have
changed since these prior studies is that many states, evaluating
their state evidentiary standards, switched from Frye to Daubert in
the mid to late 1990s. So during the data-collection periods of sev-
eral of the prior studies, some states adhered to Frye but have
changed to Daubert since. For more on this issue, see infra Part
II.d and text accompanying notes 22-25.
4. The trilogy comprises Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999), Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136, and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
5. LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FED-
ERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION (2001).
6. Id. at Table 4.1. 
7. Id. at 29.
In the Daubert decision of 1993, the Supreme Court directedfederal judges to screen expert evidence for reliability beforeadmission, rejecting the “general acceptance” standard of
Frye v. United States.1 To ensure the appropriate level of relia-
bility to admit expert testimony, the Court suggested a series of
substantive factors for judges to analyze, such as peer review
and the Frye “general acceptance” standard. Several years later
in General Electric v. Joiner, Justice Breyer also suggested pro-
cedures judges could use to decide gatekeeping questions.2
In the years after Daubert, researchers began to evaluate
how judges perform this Rule 702 reliability screening. One
group of studies considered the frequency of expert-reliability
challenges, finding that litigants raised reliability issues more
often after Daubert than before. Other studies considered the
methodology of expert gatekeeping by analyzing the proce-
dures used by judges in deciding reliability questions. Others
chose to focus on the substantive factors that judges consider
when gatekeeping expert testimony, finding that some of the
Daubert factors were more useful than others. 
Together these studies provide some baseline data on
Daubert’s effect, but as useful as they are, they leave significant
questions unanswered. They also rely on data from the 1990s,
so they may reflect courtroom standards that have changed.3
The survey discussed here is intended to address those con-
cerns by broadly analyzing how judges perform gatekeeping.
The survey was designed to answer the following questions:
• How often did judges see motions challenging the reliabil-
ity of expert testimony, and how often did they grant them?
• What procedural methodologies did they use in facing reli-
ability motions?
• What substantive factors are helpful in deciding reliability
motions? 
• Considering the guidance they had on how to perform gate-
keeping, were they comfortable doing so?
By asking judges these questions, the survey would not only
shed light on whether judges have sufficient guidance for their
gatekeeping role but could also inform judges how other
judges screen expert testimony in their courtrooms. Finally,
the survey would provide updated baseline data on the gate-
keeping role, which could inform the debate on whether pol-
icy changes are in order. 
This article will examine these issues in detail by explaining
the prior research in the area, examining the methodology and
results of the judicial survey, and then finishing with some
thoughts on the importance of the survey’s findings. By mea-
suring the practices of judges handling reliability challenges,
this survey provides significant insight into the reality of
expert gatekeeping and whether the Supreme Court’s guidance
matches the reality in courtrooms today.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MECHANICS AND FREQUENCY
OF GATEKEEPING
In the years surrounding the Daubert trilogy,4 researchers
began to explore fundamental questions about what reliability
screening meant and how it was to be done. These studies were
critically important in understanding the initial impact of
Daubert by measuring the frequency of, procedures for, and
substantive factors judges used to decide expert-reliability
challenges. 
Prior Studies Analyzing the Frequency of Daubert or 
Reliability Challenges
In the first decade after Daubert, three separate studies
touched on the issue of how frequently reliability challenges
occur. In only one, however, did the researchers address the
absolute rate of challenges. That study, performed by Lloyd
Dixon and Brian Gill and published in 2001, evaluated the rate
of reliability challenges both before and after Daubert by exam-
ining a computerized database of reported case opinions.5
They found that in the four years before Daubert, the likeli-
hood of a reliability issue arising was between 68 and 71% but
that it had risen to between 76 and 89% in the four years after
Daubert.6 The data also showed a similar increase in the likeli-
hood of a judge finding the expert unreliable. They concluded
that these increases suggest that under Daubert, reliability stan-
dards had tightened, which encouraged litigants to file more
challenges to opponents’ experts.7
The Gatekeeper’s Toolbox: 
A Survey on Judicial Handling of Expert-Reliability Motions
Andrew W. Jurs
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8. Jennifer Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility
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9. Id. at 345-46.
10. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and
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11. Id. at 321.
12. Id.
13. Id. at Table 5.
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fer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2007).
15. Id. at Tables 2 & 3.
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17. DIXON & GILL, supra note 5, at 39.
18. Groscup et al., supra note 8, at Table 5.
19. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Sur-
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25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
20. Id. at 447.
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The next year saw another database study of Daubert by a
group of researchers led by Jennifer Groscup.8 As with Dixon &
Gill, their study evaluated reported case opinions from a com-
puterized database in the years surrounding Daubert, except in
this study, the researchers were examining criminal rather than
civil cases. Yet the study only measured the frequency of admit-
ting experts at the trial and appellate levels rather than the
absolute rate of challenges. They found that more than 74% of
experts had been admitted at trial and that the rate on appeal
remained above 69%, although the admission rate varied dra-
matically between prosecution and defense experts.9
Beyond those two database studies, Carol Krafka and her
colleagues published a survey in 2002 also touching on the
issue of frequency of reliability challenges.10 Relying on surveys
of state court judges from 1991 and 1998, the Krafka study
found that litigants raised reliability challenges in a motion in
limine at much higher rates after Daubert than before.11 The
authors noted, however, that their survey did not and could not
address the general frequency of reliability challenges.12
Prior Studies Analyzing the Procedures Judges Use to Decide
Reliability Motions
As with the studies addressing frequency of reliability chal-
lenges, the most recent data on the procedural methodology of
gatekeeping had also been collected in the late 1990s. The
Krafka study, relying on surveys of federal judges performed in
1991 and 1998, specifically asked judges what procedures they
used in all cases involving experts as well as what procedures
they used in complex expert cases. Her survey found that some
methods, like pretrial conferences or hearings on reliability,
were commonly used in all cases with experts, while others,
such as independent experts or special masters, were reserved
for cases with complex expert issues.13 The Krafka study pro-
vided a comprehensive snapshot of the methodologies used by
federal judges to resolve Daubert challenges in the years sur-
rounding Daubert.
Shirley Dobbin and her colleagues performed a survey of
both federal and state court judges in 1999, which also asked
about strategies for handling expert evidence.14 As with Krafka’s
study, the researchers asked which methodologies were used in
all cases with experts and which were only for more complex or
difficult cases. The Dobbin study found that state court judges
were less likely than their federal counterparts to ask questions
from the bench under Rule 614 or to ask the parties for instruc-
tion or education on the area of expertise.15 On the other hand,
state court judges were more likely than federal judges to use an
independent expert under Rule 706.16
Prior Studies Analyzing the Substantive Factors Judges 
Consider on Reliability 
Finally, several of these studies also touched upon the sub-
stantive factors judges used to determine reliability motions,
both by database analysis and by survey methodologies. Two
studies—Dixon & Gill’s and Groscup’s—analyzed how often
certain terms, the “Daubert factors” from the original Daubert
opinion, appeared in reported cases during the 1990s. Dixon
& Gill analyzed these terms in reported decisions of civil cases
and found that judges most commonly analyzed general accep-
tance and peer review in making reliability choices.17
Groscup’s findings are quite similar in this area. Her study
found that when examining the appearance of the “Daubert
factors” in criminal cases, judges were most likely to analyze
general acceptance and peer review, although she is careful to
note that all of these terms appear less frequently than more
general terms such as relevance, reliability, or qualifications.18
In addition to the computerized database analysis, one pub-
lished study addressed the substantive factors in gatekeeping
using a survey methodology. Relying on surveys collected in
1999, Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues published a study in
2001 regarding how judges decide gatekeeping motions.19 As
with the database analysis, Gatowski et al. found that judges
were most likely to consider general acceptance and peer
review in assessing reliability challenges, with 93% and 92%
answering each factor was useful, respectively.20
Conclusion Regarding Prior Research into Judicial 
Gatekeeping
In each of these areas—frequency, procedures, and sub-
stance—research in the first decade after Daubert established
some baseline data about judicial gatekeeping. Why, then, is
further research needed? Several important considerations lead
to the conclusion that updating prior work in this area is nec-
essary.
First, the surveys and gatekeeping databases for these stud-
ies are from the 1990s, which partially explains their import in
the years right after Daubert. Yet the date of data collection suf-
fers from a major weakness: The three decisions of the
“Daubert trilogy” had not all been finalized when the data was
collected. Since the last decision—Kumho Tire in 1999—
expanded the gatekeeping role to non-scientific technical
expertise, judges may have had to rethink their gatekeeping
approaches after that decision.21
Second, when the survey involves state court judges, the
Daubert case may not be the correct starting point anyway. For
federal judges, Daubert had rejected the Frye standard for gate-
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22. For a list of states that have adopted a Daubert-type analysis, see
Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scien-
tific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453
(2001). See also DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.4.2.a n.16 (2d
ed. 2004).
23. For a list of Frye states, see KAYE ET AL., supra note 22, at § 6.4.2.a
n.17; Lustre, supra note 22, at 453.
24. See, e.g., Andrew W. Jurs, Balancing Legal Process with Scientific
Expertise: A Comparative Assessment of Expert Witness Methodology
in Five Nations, and Suggestions for Reform of Post-Daubert U.S.
Reliability Determinations, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1329 (2012); Andrew
W. Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the
Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as Test Case for Reform
Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 49 (2009); Gatowski et al., supra note
19, at 442 (judges split on whether they believe they have the nec-
essary background to handle scientific evidence in their court-
room). 
25. For a detailed explanation of this consideration, please see the
complete study, Gatekeeper with a Gavel: A Survey on Judicial Man-
agement of Challenges to Expert Reliability and Their Relationship to
Summary Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 325, 341 n. 101 (2014).
keeping in favor of a reliability approach. But in the states,
judges had to wait until their own state supreme courts
decided whether Frye’s “general acceptance” test or Daubert’s
reliability standard would remain the state gatekeeping stan-
dard. In the 1990s, many states adopted a Daubert-like relia-
bility standard,22 but others did not, choosing to remain with
Frye.23 Since the survey data had been collected during this
transition period, a follow-up survey could capture the more
stable current environment. 
Third, while the prior studies evaluated many aspects of
gatekeeping, they didn’t and couldn’t cover them all. The sur-
vey could therefore be designed to update prior survey find-
ings and expand into additional areas not covered before. 
Finally, research since Daubert has suggested that judges
might be having difficulty with the gatekeeping role, particularly
with new or cutting-edge science.24 Whether or not this is true,
an accounting of the methodology of gatekeeping in modern
courtrooms could establish which tools are in use and which are
not, informing the policy debate surrounding Daubert.
SURVEY DESIGN
So to establish baseline data about gatekeeping methodolo-
gies and update prior work in the area, I began to design a sur-
vey tool as well as think about which judges should answer it.
The survey required three main design choices, as follows:
• Which judges should be involved?
• Which states should the judges come from? and
• What specific questions should be asked regarding gate-
keeping?
With detailed front-side planning, I could maximize the
scope and impact of the findings by making deliberate and
judicious choices about who to involve and what to ask them. 
Selecting the judges was the first issue to finalize, and so it
became necessary to decide which judges would be “in” and
which would be “out” and to have a principled reason for this
distinction. After considering the alternatives, I ultimately
decided to involve only the state court judges who sat on the
bench of the “highest” trial court in their state. These judges
are often (but not always) the most experienced, so they would
be likely to be familiar with the procedures in the study. Even
more importantly, they would also have the jurisdiction to hear
the most complex civil cases, in which expert-reliability chal-
lenges would likely arise. 
Once the judges were selected, the next step was to decide
where to find them. The selection of states offered an opportu-
nity to perform a natural experiment. By selecting states from
different regions of the United States as well as states that had
different admissibility standards for expert gatekeeping, the
study could examine whether regional culture or the home-
state reliability standard has an effect on the way judges ana-
lyze reliability. To evaluate those considerations, the study
would involve several different regions of the U.S., and in each
region there would be one state with Frye as the home-state
standard and one with Daubert as the standard. Furthermore,
the underlying rules of civil procedure would have to be as
broadly compatible as possible.25 Considering these factors,
the study incorporates three regions of the U.S.—West, Mid-
west, and South, as follows:
Limiting participation to these six states and only those
judges previously mentioned, the survey began with a total of
996 eligible participants. Each judge received a mailed letter
asking him or her to participate in an online survey and an
additional reminder after several months.
Finally, to broadly evaluate the methodology of gatekeep-
ing, I needed to decide specifically what questions to ask. To
establish the frequency with which judges handle these
motions, the survey asked them how often they see reliability
motions, how often they rule on them, and how often they
grant them. To see the methodologies of handling reliability
motions, the survey asked the judges about the procedures
they used to decide them as well as which substantive factors
FIGURE 1: JUDGES SELECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SURVEY
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26. Thank you to all judges who took the time to participate. 27. 522 U.S. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring).
were most helpful in guiding those decisions. Judges were also
asked how comfortable they were with reliability motions as a
way to distill their thoughts about the motions to one basic
concept. Finally, to have a point of comparison, I also decided
to ask the judges about a different type of motion—the sum-
mary-judgment motion. 
Once the design was complete, the survey went to the pre-
selected eligible judges, resulting in 158 complete responses to
all questions.26 These responses form a unique dataset, provid-
ing a great deal of information about judicial gatekeeping in
courtrooms today. 
RESULTS
In providing the results, I will start by exploring the judicial
responses to questions about handling expert-reliability
motions. I will then compare those responses to the responses
on summary-judgment motions and compare responses
between different groups of judges. 
Expert-Reliability Motions
The survey first addressed the frequency of expert-reliabil-
ity motions. I asked the judges how often they see a motion
challenging the reliability of an expert in cases with experts.
The judges overwhelmingly believed this was an uncommon
occurrence, with 32% answering that it occurred in less than
1% of cases with experts and an additional 35% answering that
it occurred between 1% and 5% of the time. The responses to
this question can be seen in Figure 2.
I next asked the judges about how they decide reliability
motions, including questions on the substantive factors that
guide those decisions and the procedures they have used in
making those choices. On the issue of substantive factors, I
provided judges with a list of the “Daubert factors” and asked
them to choose any factors that they believed are helpful in
deciding reliability motions. The responses indicate that gen-
eral acceptance is the most helpful substantive factor in decid-
ing reliability motions, with over 96% of judges selecting it. On
the other hand, judges were least likely to choose error rate as
a helpful factor for them, with only 70% choosing it from the
list. The responses to this question appear below, as Figure 3.
To find which procedures judges use to decide reliability
motions, I decided to ask only those judges who had ruled on
this type of motion before so that the responses would reflect
those procedures actually used, not those judges might use. As
with the question about substantive factors, I provided judges
with a list of potential procedures and asked them to select any
option that they used. As with the previous question, these fac-
tors were not selected out of thin air but instead were those
procedures that Justice Breyer suggested for reliability analysis
in his concurrence in General Electric v. Joiner.27 In reviewing
responses, an overwhelming majority of judges had used a
hearing with testimony presented to decide a reliability
motion, while a slim majority of judges used a hearing without
testimony or questioning a witness from the bench. On the
other hand, it was very rare for a judge to use a special master
or independent expert to decide a reliability motion. These
responses are displayed in Figure 4.
So having found what factors judges consider and what pro-
cedures judges use to decide reliability motions, I then asked
the judges how often they granted a motion to limit expert tes-
timony. As with the question regarding procedures, this ques-
tion was asked only of those judges who had ever ruled on a
reliability motion. The responses indicate that limiting testi-
FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY OF MOTIONS CHALLENGING 
EXPERT RELIABILITY, IN CASES WITH EXPERTS
FIGURE 4: PROCEDURAL METHODS USED BY JUDGES
TO DECIDE RELIABILITY MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE
PERCENT-
AGE
Hearing With Testimony Presented 101 85.6
Hearing Without Testimony Presented 63 53.4
Questioning a Witness from the Bench 64 54.2
Independent Expert 9 7.6
Special Master 4 3.4
Other 10 8.4
Total = 118
FIGURE 3: SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS JUDGES BELIEVE ARE 
HELPFUL IN DECIDING RELIABILITY MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
BELIEVE THE FACTOR
IS HELPFUL
PERCENTAGE
Technique Can and Has Been
Tested
143 90.5
Subjected to Peer Review/Pub-
lication
139 87.8
Known or Potential Rate of
Error
111 70.2
Existence of Standards Con-
trolling the Technique
128 81.0
General Acceptance 152 96.2
Other 8 5.1
Total = 158
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28. In addition to allowing a comparison of the motions, the other
reason for this choice was a lingering question in the literature
about the relationship between reliability challenges and suffi-
ciency challenges (summary judgment). For a detailed explana-
tion of this issue, please see the complete study, supra note 25, at
335-39.
mony is quite rare. Of the judges who had ruled on a reliabil-
ity motion, 43% had never granted that motion and limited
expert testimony. For the remainder who had limited expert
testimony, almost all of them had done so five or fewer times,
with only 7% of the judges who had ruled on this motion hav-
ing limited testimony six or more times. These responses
appear in Figure 5 below.
Finally, I wanted to ask judges whether, considering the
procedures at their disposal and the factors they must consider,
they are comfortable with expert-reliability motions. Each of
these questions involved quantifying their comfort level with
the motion on a seven-point scale, with one representing
“entirely comfortable” and seven representing “not comfort-
able.” I first asked all judges how comfortable they were with
expert-reliability motions, and in response, judges’ answers
were quite varied. Only 20% of judges indicated they were
“entirely comfortable” with the motion (category one), with an
additional 35% of judges answering they were mostly comfort-
able (category two). On the other hand, 45% of judges
responded to this question by choosing categories three to
seven. These responses appear below, as Figure 6.
I also asked a second question to those judges who had
granted a motion challenging expert reliability—about their
comfort level in limiting expert testimony. As compared to the
group of all judges, these responses were slightly more favor-
able, with 65% of judges answering in categories one or two, as
opposed to 55% of all judges. In addition, no judge answered
“not comfortable” in response to this question, so the remain-
ing 35% all appeared in categories three through six. The com-
fort-level responses to this question appear as Figure 7.
The combined responses to the questions about expert-relia-
bility motions contained in Figures 2 through 7 establish some
baseline data about the frequency of expert-reliability chal-
lenges, how judges decide them, and how often they are granted.
But I decided, when designing the study, that the results would
not be as useful as possible when standing alone. Instead, I also
asked about a different type of motion—summary judgment—
as a point of comparison.28 With the judges’ responses to these
questions, I could compare the motions in many areas.
Comparing Expert-Reliability to Summary-Judgment Motions
In examining the frequency of the two types of motions, one
can immediately determine that summary judgment is a much
more common issue for judges to handle. When I asked the
judges in what percentage of civil cases they saw a contested
motion for summary judgment, a majority (52%) indicated
this happened in over 20% of all civil cases, and an additional
24% indicated between 11 and 20% of all civil cases. Unques-
tionably, the pattern for summary judgment is different than
expert reliability, as displayed in Figure 8.
Next I decided to ask judges about the methodology of
deciding summary-judgment motions, to compare those
responses to expert-reliability motions. The responses indicate
significant differences in how judges handle these motions: for
summary judgment, only 28% of judges use a hearing with tes-
timony (86% for reliability) and 6.2% question a witness from
the bench (54% for reliability). On the other hand, indepen-
dent experts and special masters remain rare in both instances.
The responses can be compared using the chart in Figure 9.
FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY OF LIMITING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY PURSUANT TO A RELIABILITY MOTION, 
OF JUDGES WHO HAVE RULED ON ONE
FIGURE 6: COMFORT LEVEL WITH EXPERT-RELIABILITY
MOTIONS, ALL JUDGES (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
FIGURE 7: COMFORT LEVEL WITH LIMITING EXPERT TESTI-
MONY PUSUANT TO EXPERT-RELIABILITY MOTION, OF
JUDGES WHO HAVE DONE SO (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
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The next comparison deals with the likelihood of a judge
granting the motion. I asked judges how often they have
granted a contested motion for summary judgment in whole or
in part. As with reliability motions, this question was only for
those judges who have ruled on this type of motion. In
response, over 44% of judges indicated they had granted sum-
mary judgment in over 20 cases, while only a very few judges
(4%) had ruled on such a motion but never granted it. When
examined graphically, the distinction in the responses between
these motions is clear:
Responses about the judges’ comfort level with both
motions provides a final point of comparison between the
motions. When asked about expert-reliability motions, only
55% of judges answered they were entirely or mostly comfort-
able with the motion (categories one and two).29 Judges were
much more comfortable with summary-judgment motions.
When I asked all judges to rate their comfort level with these
motions on the seven-point scale, 57% answered they were
entirely comfortable, and an additional 28% answered mostly
comfortable, for a total of 85% in categories one and two. The
judges’ responses to the question about their comfort level
with both motions appear graphically as Figure 11. 
The same pattern is true for the comfort level with granting
the motions. For expert-reliability motions, 65% of judges
answered they were entirely or mostly comfortable with grant-
ing the motion. As with summary judgment generally, the
comfort level for granting summary judgment significantly
exceeded the reliability number. Just as with the general com-
fort with summary judgment, 85% of the judges responded
they were entirely or mostly comfortable with granting sum-
mary judgment, in categories one or two. The judges’
responses to these questions appear below in Figure 12. 
FIGURE 8: FREQUENCY OF EXPERT-RELIABILITY 
AND SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
FIGURE 10: FREQUENCY OF GRANTING EITHER 
EXPERT-RELIABILITY OR SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION
FIGURE 11: COMFORT LEVEL WITH EACH MOTION,
ALL JUDGES (“ENTIRELY COMFORTABLE”=1)
FIGURE 9: PROCEDURAL METHODS USED BY JUDGES TO DECIDE MOTIONS
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE 
(EXPERT RELIABILITY)
PERCENTAGE
NUMBER WHO 
HAVE USED THE
TECHNIQUE
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT)
PERCENTAGE
Hearing With Testimony 101 85.6 40 27.6
Hearing Without Testimony 63 53.4 123 84.8
Questioning a Witness from the Bench 64 54.2 9 6.2
Independent Expert 9 7.6 5 3.4
Special Master 4 3.4 5 3.4
Other 10 8.4 20 13.8
Total = 118 Total = 145
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30. DIXON & GILL, supra note 5, at 39; Groscup et al., supra note 8, at
Table 5; Gatowski et al., supra note 19, at 445-47.
Comparison of Responses by Judges’ Backgrounds 
When I designed the survey, I had been very careful in
choosing which states would participate so that I could per-
form several natural experiments. In selecting the six states I
used, I could split the responses I received into different
groups and then re-examine them based on state, region, and
also the home-state expert admissibility standard. I also asked
judges about their backgrounds, with questions about their
years of experience on the bench, years in practice, and train-
ing or comfort level with math and science. 
When I evaluated these different groupings, what surprised
me most was how few differences existed between categories of
judges. While a smattering of differences arose, the main cate-
gory where judges answered questions differently involved the
home-state gatekeeping standard. These differences arose in
response to two questions. 
The first deals with the frequency of facing reliability
motions, a question discussed above and reported in Figure 2.
When the complete set of judicial responses was split, how-
ever, between judges from Daubert states and judges from Frye
states, the result does show a clear difference: Daubert judges
face more reliability motions. In Figure 13, the responses from
both groups are reported, and the responses indicate Daubert
judges are more likely to believe reliability motions happen in
11% or more of their cases and less likely to believe that
expert-reliability motions occur in a very small percentage
(less than 1%) of their cases.
The frequency question provided one difference between
Frye and Daubert judges, and the other difference occurred in
response to a final question in which I asked directly: “Which
standard is the stricter one for reliability of scientific evi-
dence—Frye or Daubert?” When I asked Frye judges this ques-
tion, they were evenly split, with 50.4% answering Daubert and
49.6% answering Frye. The Daubert judges’ responses were
quite different, however. An overwhelming majority of those
judges—87%—believed the Daubert standard was stricter than
Frye. These responses appear in Figure 14.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The survey responses discussed above provide baseline data
on the frequency and handling of expert-reliability motions in
courtrooms today as well as insight into judicial attitudes
about such motions. Having reviewed the response data, I
would like to highlight those results of the study that were
most interesting.
The intent of the study was to both update and expand prior
research in the area of expert gatekeeping. The data do seem
remarkably consistent with the prior studies in the area to the
extent they have measured these issues. For example, all three
research studies from the 1990s that measured substantive fac-
tors for gatekeeping found that the most important substantive
factors in deciding an expert-reliability motion were general
acceptance and peer review.30 Judges responding to this survey
found general acceptance the most helpful substantive factor
and peer review the third most helpful (behind testing).
Beyond substantive factors, the results also are broadly similar
to prior studies on procedures too. Prior studies showed judges
were unlikely to use an independent expert in their court-
rooms, and this survey confirms that finding, with only 7.6%
of judges using that technique for a reliability motion. 
Beyond confirming prior research, however, the study here
does branch into new areas. It provides baseline data on the
frequency of expert-reliability motions and also on how fre-
quently they are granted. The study also had judges distill their
opinions about expert-reliability motions into one basic con-
cept—“comfort level”—and it shows judges are somewhat
comfortable with reliability motions but not “entirely comfort-
able” either.
The survey is also useful in being able to compare responses
about reliability motions, like the “comfort level” answers,
with another common type of motion, summary judgment. By
comparing the two, the survey shows us that judges are signif-
icantly less comfortable with motions about reliability than
FIGURE 12: COMFORT LEVEL WITH GRANTING EACH
MOTION, OF JUDGES WHO HAVE DONE SO
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FIGURE 13: FREQUENCY OF EXPERT-RELIABILITY MOTIONS,
BY HOME-STATE GATEKEEPING STANDARD
FIGURE 14: FRYE OR DAUBERT AS A STRICTER TEST,
BY HOME-STATE GATEKEEPING STANDARD
HOME-STATE
GATEKEEPING STANDARD
Frye Daubert
WHICH IS
STRICTER?
Frye 50.4% 87%
Daubert 49.6% 13%
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31. In addition to studying this question with surveys, a co-author
and I have been studying which standard is stricter using a statis-
tical approach. In those studies, we found that—using a database
of millions of real cases—civil litigants act in ways demonstrating
that Daubert is a stricter standard. Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito,
Et Tu, Plaintiffs? An Empirical Analysis of Daubert’s Effect on Plain-
tiffs, and Why Gatekeeping Standards Matter (a Lot), 66 ARK. L.
REV. 975 (2013); Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter
Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil
Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (2013).
with summary judgment. The responses also show judges face
many more motions for summary judgment in their court-
rooms than reliability challenges and are more likely to have
granted a motion for summary judgment as well. 
Finally, the survey results can be split into subgroups, and
by comparing the groups, we can see differences in the answers
between home-state Daubert judges and home-state Frye
judges. The judges from Daubert states reported a higher fre-
quency of expert-reliability challenges than their Frye counter-
parts. When asked to compare the two standards, Daubert
judges believed their own standard was stricter, while Frye
judges were evenly split between the two standards. These
responses indicate that if a judge has used the Daubert stan-
dard, that judge is more likely to believe it is stricter.31
By asking judges about their handling of expert-reliability
motions, this study provides baseline data about how judges
decide these motions and how often they see them; in doing
so, it informs the policy debate about whether the current tools
at their disposal are appropriate to the task. 
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The use of psychological and psychiatric evaluations forthe courts has grown considerably in the last threedecades.1 For the purposes of this article, we will refer to
such an evaluation as a forensic mental-health assessment
(FMHA). There are two important components to the defini-
tion of FMHA. First, such activity involves evaluations con-
ducted in the context of criminal or civil proceedings.2 Second,
it includes certain kinds of tasks—such as reconstructing a
past mental state and linking it with the functional-legal capac-
ities specified in a given legal test (such as insanity at the time
of the offense) or evaluating a current mental state and
appraising the extent to which it affects such functional legal
capacities (such as those described in competence-to-stand-
trial evaluations).3
We begin by discussing FMHA in greater detail. This dis-
cussion includes broad foundational principles applicable to
all such evaluations, as well as a brief description of 17 com-
monly evaluated types of FMHA. In this context, we then turn
to the use of third-party information, or TPI (collateral inter-
views, records, and other documents or digital evidence), in
FMHA. This discussion will address the importance, the value
and limitations, and the current legal and professional status of
TPI in forensic assessment. 
NATURE AND TYPES OF FMHA
There are certain broad, foundational principles that are
applicable to all FMHA, even that conducted in response to
different legal questions, in different domains (civil vs. crimi-
nal vs. juvenile/family), and with different populations. These
principles have been derived, described,4 and subsequently
modified.5 They are presented sequentially (in the order in
which they apply when conducting FMHA).6
One reflection of the progress of forensic psychology and
forensic psychiatry as specialty disciplines is the recent com-
pletion of a book series devoted to best practices in FMHA.
The series includes 17 books,7 the first describing foundational
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TABLE 1
TITLES IN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES: BEST 
PRACTICES IN FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT
Criminal Titles
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial
Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility
Evaluation of Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights 
Evaluation of Sexually Violent Predators
Evaluation for Risk of Violence in Adults 
Evaluation for Capital Sentencing 
Civil Titles
Evaluation of Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research
Evaluation for Guardianship
Evaluation for Civil Commitment
Evaluation for Personal Injury Claims 
Evaluation for Workplace Discrimination and Harassment 
Evaluation of Workplace Disability
Juvenile and Family Titles
Evaluation for Child Custody 
Evaluation of Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial
Evaluation for Risk of Violence in Juveniles 
Evaluation for Parenting Capacity in Child Protection
Adapted with permission from KIRK HEILBRUN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC MEN-
TAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT 148 (2009).
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24. See generally HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (Randy K.
Otto & Kevin Douglas eds., 2010). 
25. D.A. ANDREW & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CON-
DUCT (5th ed.) (2010).
26. KIRK HEILBRUN, EVALUATION FOR RISK OF VIOLENCE IN ADULTS
(2009).
27. ROBERT D. HOGE & D.A. ANDREWS, EVALUATION FOR RISK OF VIO-
LENCE IN JUVENILES (2010).
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
principles of FMHA8 and the remainder each devoted to a par-
ticular legal question for which FMHA may be useful in pro-
viding relevant evaluative information and opinions to the
court.9 The FMHA principles were derived to distinguish
forensic evaluation from other forms of psychological and psy-
chiatric assessment (done primarily for the purposes of diag-
nosis and treatment planning) and are supported by sources of
authority that include law, science, ethics, and practice;10 they
were subsequently expanded to include additional material
developed between 2001 and 2009.11 Since this range of topics
was selected to encompass the kinds of evaluations most often
requested by courts and attorneys, it seems reasonable to con-
sider these 16 specific topics as encompassing nearly the entire
range of topics that are addressed with any frequency by
FMHA. 
Competence to Stand Trial. This legal question concerns
whether a juvenile12 or criminal defendant13 is fit to proceed
with disposition of charges. The applicable legal test is whether
the individual “has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.”14
Criminal Responsibility. Unlike competence to stand trial,
there is no single legal standard for criminal responsibility. The
M’Naghten standard is used in a number of U.S. jurisdictions:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of rea-
son, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.15
The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code proposed
in 1962 that a defendant be acquitted by reason of insanity if
“as a result of mental illness or mental defect he lacked sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law,”16 a standard which was adopted in a number of states and
the federal jurisdiction and amended in some jurisdictions
post-Hinckley to drop the “volitional prong” (“conform con-
duct to the requirements of the law”). Four states have abol-
ished the insanity defense; New Hampshire continues to use
the product standard17 that would acquit a defendant by reason
of insanity if the criminal behavior was the “product of mental
disease or defect.”18
Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights. Juvenile or criminal
suspects undergoing custodial interrogation have Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights.19 Defendants who choose to waive
these rights must do so in a knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary fashion in order for any inculpatory statement to be
admissible.20 FMHA on this topic can assist the court in deter-
mining whether a defendant in custody had the requisite
capacities to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver.21
Sexual Offenders: Sentencing, Registration/Community
Notification, and Post-Sentence Commitment. There are differ-
ent legal questions that pertain to convicted sexual offenders.
These include whether the convicted offender meets criteria
for an enhanced sentence, whether an offender living in or
returning to the community meets criteria for registration or
community notification, and whether offenders meet special-
ized civil-commitment criteria22 following completion of a
criminal sentence. Since these criteria vary somewhat, it is
important that FMHA focus on the particular legal question
and the specific capacities associated with it.23
Risk of Violence in Adults and Juveniles. The field has
advanced considerably in the last 25 years in providing empir-
ically supported appraisal of the risk of future violence or other
offending.24 Such risk assessment, when accompanied by the
appraisal of needs and responsivity,25 is typically not a legal
question in the same respect as other legal questions noted in
this section. Rather, risk assessment is a component of a vari-
ety of criminal and civil questions for adults26 and juveniles.27
Capital Sentencing: Aggravation and Mitigation. Under Fur-
man v. Georgia,28 capital punishment as it was then practiced in
the United States was held to be unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. An individualized consideration
of the aggravating and mitigating factors for each defendant
provides a framework that satisfies constitutional demands.29
Accordingly, FMHA conducted in the context of capital sen-
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tencing provides information regarding the statutorily enu-
merated aggravating and mitigating factors—and other infor-
mation not specifically cited in statutes that may be relevant to
the court’s or jury’s determination of whether a capital sentence
should be imposed.30
Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research. Turning
from criminal to civil legal questions, the question may arise
regarding whether an individual has the requisite capacities to
consent to various kinds of treatments or to participate in a
research study. The construct of informed consent is essential in
gauging whether an individual has such capacity. The contem-
porary “patient-centered standard”31 for such informed consent
was enumerated in Canterbury v. Spence,32 involving the focus
on the patient’s understanding rather than the doctor’s profes-
sional discretion in determining what information should be
conveyed as part of obtaining such consent. FMHA regarding
such capacity has been guided by the work of investigators who
have identified four relevant components: understanding,
appreciating, reasoning, and communicating a choice.33
Guardianship. This is a legal process in which an individual,
possibly unable to manage his or her personal or financial
affairs, is reviewed by the court, which appoints a substituted
decision maker if that person is incompetent for such func-
tions.34 Tasks such as making a will, voting, marrying, driving
a car, making financial transactions, and other aspects of inde-
pendent living are included among the areas covered in
guardianship proceedings. In the absence of relevant Supreme
Court caselaw, the legal standards vary by jurisdiction, with
capacities such as understanding, reasoning, and communica-
tion among those important in FMHA evaluations of this kind
of competence.35
Civil Commitment. The question of whether an individual
with a mental disorder should be involuntarily committed to a
hospital is answered somewhat differently across different
states. Generally, commitment criteria contain a prong reflect-
ing the presence of such a mental disorder and a second prong
on the question of whether the individual, as a result of the
symptoms of such a disorder, would be a danger to others or
self (either through active self-harm or grave disability).
FMHA provides information both about the nature of the men-
tal disorder and the risk of harm to self or others that results.36
Personal Injury. The applicability of FMHA in personal-
injury litigation is generally limited to cases in which it is
alleged that the defendant, owing a duty to the plaintiff but
breaching that duty, proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer
mental/emotional harm, sometimes in combination with phys-
ical harm.37 The forensic mental-health evaluations in this area
consequently focus on the nature and genuineness of the
plaintiff’s reported symptoms and the extent to which they
were caused by the alleged conduct of the defendant. 
Workplace Discrimination and Harassment. This is a partic-
ular form of personal injury that is governed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, or gender in the work-
place.38 The considerations for FMHA evaluation in this area
are similar to those in personal injury more generally: whether
the plaintiff has suffered mental/emotional injury resulting
from the defendant’s alleged behavior.
Workplace Disability. The other major workplace issue that
can be addressed through FMHA involves whether an individ-
ual is disabled from working. This is not necessarily a legal
matter, as workplace disability decisions may relate to the
applicability of private disability insurance. The more clearly
legal components in this domain encompass matters such as
eligibility for Social Security Disability Income or cases involv-
ing workers compensation.39 Relevant FMHA focuses on the
nature of the mental disorder and its impact on the functional
capacities that are important in the workplace.
Child Custody. Determining the custodial arrangement that
will serve the best interest of a child whose parents divorce can
be complex and sometimes contentious. Within the umbrella
of this “best interest” standard are the components of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, which have been adopted
directly by a number of states, including parental wishes;
child’s wishes; relationship of the child with any persons who
may significantly affect the best interest; the child’s adjustment
to home, school, and community; and the mental and physical
health of all involved.40 FMHA in this area can be comparably
complex, as it is important to provide evaluative information
regarding each parent, each child, and the relationships of the
children with important others.
Parenting Capacity in Child Protection. The final domain
covered in the Oxford best-practices series involves the ques-
tion of when a child should be removed from the custody of a
parent due to incapacity. Parenting rights have been recognized
as fundamental41 although not absolute42—and legal authori-
ties are understandably reluctant to terminate parental rights
without compelling reason.43 Evaluations conducted by foren-
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sic clinicians can help the court make decisions involving con-
ditions of access, with a specific focus on the harm that may
occur and the parent’s role in exacerbating (or minimizing)
such risk of harm.44
USING TPI IN FMHA
Third-party information in FMHA refers to information
obtained directly from parties who are not litigants; it also
encompasses records that are relevant to the litigant’s history
(whether they are yet part of the evidentiary record). Such
records are considered broadly to encompass letters, diaries, e-
mail and text messages, postings on social-media sites, and
other sources of information that may have originated with the
litigant but now exist in archival form. 
In addressing the value of TPI for FMHA, it is useful to
ground this discussion in the FMHA principles discussed
TABLE 2
PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL-HEALTH ASSESSMENT
GENERALLY
1. Be aware of the important differences between clinical and
forensic domains.
2. Obtain appropriate education, training, and experience in
one’s area of forensic specialization.
3. Be familiar with the relevant legal, ethical, scientific, and prac-
tice literatures pertaining to FMHA.
4. Be guided by honesty and striving for impartiality, actively
disclosing the limitations on as well as the support for one’s
opinions.
5. Control potential evaluator bias in general through monitor-
ing case selection, continuing education, and consultation
with knowledgeable colleagues.
6. Be familiar with specific aspects of the legal system, particu-
larly communication, discovery, deposition, and testimony.
7. Do not become adversarial, but present and defend your opin-
ions effectively.
IN SPECIFIC CASES
Preparation
8. Identify relevant forensic issues.
9. Accept referrals only within area of expertise.
10.Decline the referral when evaluator impartiality is unlikely.
11.Clarify the evaluator’s role with the attorney.
12.Clarify financial arrangements.
13.Obtain appropriate authorization.
14.Avoid playing the dual roles of therapist and forensic evalua-
tor.
15.Determine the particular role to be played within forensic
assessment if the referral is accepted.
16.Select the most appropriate model to guide data gathering,
interpretation, and communication.
Data Collection
17. Use multiple sources of information for each area being
assessed. Review the available background information and
actively seek important missing elements.
18. Use relevance and reliability (validity) as guides for seeking
information and selecting data sources.
19. Obtain relevant historical information.
20. Assess clinical characteristics in relevant, reliable, and valid
ways.
21. Assess legally relevant behavior.
22. Ensure that conditions for evaluations are quiet, private, and
distraction-free.
23. Provide appropriate notification of purpose and/or obtain
appropriate authorization before beginning.
24. Determine whether the individual understands the purpose
of the evaluation and the associated limits on confidentiality.
TABLE 2 (continued)
PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MENTAL-HEALTH ASSESSMENT
Data Interpretation
25. Use third-party information in assessing response style.
26. Use testing when indicated in assessing response style.
27. Use case-specific (idiographic) evidence in assessing clinical
condition, functional abilities, and causal connection.
28. Use nomothetic evidence in assessing clinical condition, func-
tional abilities, and causal connection.
29. Use scientific reasoning in assessing causal connection between
clinical condition and functional abilities.
30. Carefully consider whether to answer the ultimate legal ques-
tion. If it is answered, it should be in the context of a thorough
evaluation clearly describing data and reasoning and with the clear
recognition that this question is in the domain of the legal decision
maker.
31. Describe findings and limits so that they need change little
under cross-examination.
Written Communication
32. Attribute information to sources.
33. Use plain language; avoid technical jargon.
34. Write report in sections, according to model and procedures.
Testimony
35. Base testimony on the results of the properly performed
FMHA.
36. Prepare.
37. Communicate effectively.
38. Control the message. Strive to obtain, retain, and regain con-
trol over the meaning and impact of what is presented in
expert testimony.
Used with permission from KIRK HEILBRUN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC MENTAL
HEALTH ASSESSMENT 135-37 (2009).
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workplace disability. Id. Multiple surveys of FMHA professional
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majority of FMHA professionals utilize TPI. Kark Kirkland et al.,
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nal Defendants: A Review of 8,000 Evaluations, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
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Tammy D. Lander & Kirk Heilbrun, The Content and Quality of
Forensic Mental Health Assessment: Validation of a Principles-Based
Approach, 8 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 115 (2008) (finding
only a minority of their sample of 125 FMHA reports included
multiple sources of information for each area assessed or TPI for
assessing response style). For additional, older studies, see
sources cited in Kirk Heilbrun et al., Third Party Information in
Forensic Assessment, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: VOLUME 11
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 69, 72-75 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 2003);
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above and in Table 2 and to consider the various forms of
FMHA that must incorporate such TPI. 
THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF TPI
Forensic clinicians widely recognize the importance and
value of TPI, whether in the form of documents and records,
third-party interviews, or scientific data produced by
researchers. This is true both for FMHA in general45 and for
specific types of FMHA.46 In the section that follows, we dis-
cuss the advantages of TPI from the perspective of forensic
evaluators in three stages of the FMHA process: data collec-
tion, data interpretation, and written communication.47
For several reasons, clinicians conducting FMHA typically
place less faith in and reliance on an examinee’s self-report
than do evaluators conducting traditional clinical assess-
ments.48 First, the purposes of the two types of assessment dif-
fer. The purpose of the forensic mental-health evaluation is to
assist the trier of fact, not necessarily to help individual exam-
inees—whether in defending their cases or in treating their
behavioral-health needs.49 As a result, FMHA includes more
concern for how an examinee approaches an evaluation, both
in ability and in motivation to accurately report information.50
This approach comprises an examinee’s response style.51 In
addition, many forensic questions are retrospective (e.g., men-
tal state at the time of the offense, Miranda waiver, prior testa-
mentary capacity). As a result, examinees may forget some or
much about relevant past events. Information recorded closer
in time to such events, or that is consistent across or distinc-
tively recalled by collateral informants, can thus improve the
accuracy of a reconstructed history.52
The task of a forensic clinician has been compared to that of
an investigative journalist.53 During the data-collection
process, TPI is collected to seek a fuller picture of the exami-
nee—his or her background, behavioral-health symptoms and
functioning, functional legal capacities, and response style—
through a review of information not fully provided by other
sources of data such as self-report and evaluator observations.
Compiling increasing amounts of information using a multi-
method and multi-source approach allows potential explana-
tions to be tested with case-specific details.54 Forensic clini-
cians can also use TPI to help focus the report of an examinee
or collateral informant, taking care not to influence this
account by providing leading information.55
TPI is also important at the data-interpretation stage, where it
can be compared to information obtained directly from the eval-
uee to assess the consistency of information across sources.56
Such a comparison is particularly useful in reaching a conclu-
sion about an individual’s response style—whether the individ-
ual is deliberately distorting the description of mental-health
symptoms or intellectual functioning. TPI can also fill in inad-
vertent gaps in self-report information. As such, TPI increases
the perceived reliability of FMHA by addressing concerns about
examinee omissions or misreporting.57 Some psychological tests
actually require TPI for test scoring or interpretation.58
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In communicating TPI results, it is important to identify the
source; the reader must be informed what information was col-
lected from whom, when, and how.59 This attribution enables
the reader to determine whether information is consistent
across sources; when there is a question about the veracity of
specific TPI, such attribution also allows a judgment about
how relying on this TPI might affect the broader conclusions.
Plain-language TPI is also helpful to quote.60 Synthesizing TPI
and other sources of information thus facilitates report writing
and testimony that is logical, data driven, and communicated
in a manner easily understood by legal professionals.61 The
forensic clinician’s opinions will have more credibility, and
legal decision making will be improved because the evaluator’s
reasoning, as well as the limitations of his or her knowledge,
will be clearer.62 A testifying expert whose report cites all TPI
that was requested, obtained, and not obtained can more effec-
tively respond to challenges on cross-examination that his or
her opinion is biased or deficient due to an inadequate review
of the available evidence.63 In addition, experts who attribute
information to sources throughout their reports and who use
frequent quotations will be better able to describe the specific
details of their evaluations if they are later called to testify.64
LIMITATIONS OF TPI AND APPROACHES TO DEALING
WITH SUCH CHALLENGES
Despite the importance of TPI in FMHA, there are numerous
challenges to its use. Potential difficulties include practical and
legal barriers to accessing records and problems interviewing
collateral informants—including difficulty establishing contact
or refusal to participate.65 Once records are obtained or willing
collateral informants are reached, numerous additional influ-
ences may limit TPI reliability. Issues such as bias, incomplete
knowledge and limited memory, lack of understanding about
what is important, and suggestibility may all limit the accuracy
of TPI.66 Illegibility is an additional potential problem with
physical records and documents.67 Scientific research findings
(almost always in the form of “nomothetic” or group data),
which a forensic clinician may incorporate in his or her evalu-
ation, are limited to some extent in their relevance or applica-
bility.68 The rationale, methods, and interpretation of research
can always be critiqued for relevance, applicability, or design.69
Additionally, data from scientific studies—or from technical
manuals that accompany psychological tests—are rarely
included in FMHA reports, although the forensic clinician does
consider this information in reaching opinions.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
In recognition of professional confidentiality and legal-priv-
ilege considerations, forensic evaluators generally request all
relevant TPI through the retaining or appointing party, typi-
cally the attorney or the court.70 If retained, forensic clinicians
ask the appropriate attorney to use appropriate legal proce-
dures to obtain requested TPI (e.g., legal authorizations for
release, depositions, interrogatories, requests for production,
court orders, protective orders, permissions to contact collat-
eral informants) and to handle any legal disputes that may
arise over access issues.71 Evaluators appointed by court order
typically have more discretion to obtain TPI on their own ini-
tiative, particularly when obtaining such TPI is specified in the
court order. Still, there are times when it will be prudent for a
court-appointed forensic clinician to notify the attorneys in the
case about the TPI to be collected.72
Familiarity with the records commonly available for review
in various types of FMHA (e.g., police, court, probation,
school, medical, and mental-health records) helps forensic
evaluators identify what might be available and recognize
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when certain records may be missing. When a retaining exam-
inee or counsel blocks access to records, he or she should be
advised that the validity of the FMHA is correspondingly lim-
ited.73 If the withholding is significant, the forensic clinician
may need to withdraw from the assignment due to his or her
inability to complete an adequate evaluation without the
undisclosed information.74
Best practices dictate that forensic evaluators consider the
source and quality of all obtained records, noting when docu-
ments include illegible, incomplete, or possibly biased or oth-
erwise inaccurate information, and communicating anything
relevant to the integrity of reviewed materials.75 Forensic clin-
icians then incorporate documentary data carefully in their
reports, including relevant information from such sources and
summarizing such content in a systematic, impartial, and com-
prehensible manner. This is accomplished in part by listing all
information that was requested and which sources actually
were obtained and reviewed, attributing all data to its source(s)
and noting consistent and inconsistent information across
sources, quoting sources verbatim, and aiming for concise-
ness.76
In third-party interviews, forensic evaluators address poten-
tial problems by being persistent, open, respectful, flexible,
inquisitive, and judicious. When retained by one party, foren-
sic psychologists do not seek to contact the opposing party or
his or her counsel without the appropriate permission.77 To
increase the chances of establishing contact with a collateral
informant, forensic clinicians can ask retaining counsel, the
examinee, and other collateral informants for as much contact
information as is known about this third party (e.g., phone
numbers, e-mail addresses) and for advice about how best to
reach the collateral informant (e.g., what day of the week, what
time of the day). 
If multiple attempts to contact a third party prove unsuc-
cessful, forensic evaluators must decide whether to make con-
tinued efforts. If the collateral informant is expected to have
important and relevant information about the examinee, a
forensic clinician can report the problem to the retaining attor-
ney or appointing judge and request that the legal professional
try to make contact with the third party to explain the impor-
tance of the interview, schedule an informal interview, or
obtain or issue a subpoena or court order. If other obtained
collateral sources of information make the specific third-party
interview less critical, however, the forensic evaluator might
simply document in the report that contact efforts were unsuc-
cessful and note how the missing information was wholly or
partially offset by other available data. Similarly, when appre-
hensive third parties decline to be interviewed after the foren-
sic clinician makes the request and provides a notification of
purpose, that decision should be respected.78 They should not
attempt to persuade potential collateral informants—particu-
larly since reluctance may stem from a wish to avoid being
specifically identified, and descriptions of collateral interviews
must identify informants and attribute their information to
them specifically.79 Instead, forensic clinicians again should
document refusals in the report and indicate any resultant cau-
tion readers should exercise in making judgments based on the
report. Experts should also note in their reports that appropri-
ate notification procedures were utilized.80
Even if third parties can be reached, their schedules may
make it difficult for them to be interviewed at all, for more
than a brief period of time, or without interruption. This may
require the forensic evaluator to conduct a more limited inter-
view than would be ideal, to divide the interview into multiple
sessions, or to conduct the interview under less than optimal
circumstances (e.g., while the third party is within hearing dis-
tance of dependents or other persons). Forensic clinicians
dealing with such challenges should prioritize their questions
to collect the most essential information from the time-limited
informant. They should break up the interview into different
time periods when necessary and when convenient for the
informant (including during early mornings, later evenings,
and weekends). They must consider whether the circum-
stances (including distractions or the presence of other par-
ties) would invalidate any attempted interview or risk the
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. When any
interview is conducted, the evaluator must subsequently
decide whether it was of sufficient quality, relevance, and trust-
worthiness to be considered and reported. Interview condi-
tions should be noted in the evaluator’s report.
Forensic clinicians remain alert for bias, limited knowledge,
or irrelevance among collateral informants.81 Family members,
friends, and victims, among those frequently interviewed,
might tend to selectively or inaccurately report, omit, or char-
acterize information in an attempt to benefit or harm the
examinee or his or her case. Collateral informants might have
had limited contact with the examinee or only had contact in
certain contexts. As such, they may only have partial or incom-
plete knowledge about an examinee’s present or past behavior,
relationships, and other relevant domains. 
Forensic evaluators use follow-up questioning to appraise
the quality of a collateral informant’s familiarity with the exam-
inee: their closeness, the nature of their contact, and the pres-
ence of limitations such as bias or memory loss.82 Eliciting the
collateral informant’s perceptions about the examinee’s situa-
tion and circumstances, particularly through asking how the
third party would like to see the case concluded, can yield
clues about bias.83 Comparing the consistency of information
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99. Heilbrun et al., supra note 46, at 72.
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at 191-93 (noting other pro-admission rationales courts have
used, including (1) for the sake of efficiency and (2) that the evi-
dence is being admitted not for its truth but to evaluate the
from a collateral informant with information obtained from
other sources provides another potential indicator of accu-
racy.84 Accordingly, recommended practice involves interview-
ing multiple collateral informants and highlighting trends
across interviewees rather than information reported solely by
a single informant.85 Selection of third-party informants pro-
motes optimal information when subsequent informants are
chosen because they know the most about domains for which
earlier informants knew least.86 Forensic clinicians report
information from third-party informants as they report
records, including clarifying uncorroborated information, to
facilitate the reader’s own assessment of the quality of the
informational sources.87
In addition to potential bias or lack of recent close contact,
collateral informants should not convey conclusions.88 Their
observations, rather than judgments or conclusions, are
needed.89 To focus collateral informants, forensic evaluators
can use guided questioning, moving from the general to the
specific, while refraining from overly suggestive questioning.
Avoiding suggestion is particularly important with collateral
informants who do not provide detailed responses to initial
questions and hence need more specific follow-up inquiries.90
Earlier descriptions in response to general and broad ques-
tions can be compared against later responses to more specific
questions.91 The level of detail in response to an evaluator’s
questions is one indication of a collateral informant’s relevant
knowledge.92 A forensic clinician can follow up with a third
party if subsequently collected information yields discrepan-
cies; such an iterative evaluation process reflects how different
sources of data add to the picture compiled over time. In decid-
ing how to convey information obtained from collateral infor-
mants, forensic evaluators consider the sensitive nature of
much of this information, describing it as much as possible
without hyperbole and in a style designed to limit unnecessary
inflammatory impact. 
A collateral informant’s own cognitive and mental-health
functioning (e.g., apparent or reported low intelligence,
acknowledged or documented memory impairment, interper-
sonal anxiety, substance intoxication) might affect the nature
of the information that is provided and may require the foren-
sic clinician to adjust the interviewing style.93 Forensic evalu-
ators are especially careful about avoiding suggestion when
interviewing third parties with some form of impairment or
who have witnessed events under circumstances that may have
affected the accuracy of their perception or encoding of the
event (e.g., extreme and distressing events, cross-racial obser-
vations).94 The style and substance of questioning should be
adapted to the collateral informant’s personal characteristics.95
Forensic clinicians can utilize differing levels of concreteness
or abstraction in their questions or disclose non-sensitive
details (e.g., alleged date and time, documented weather con-
ditions—but not behavior that is part of the alleged offense) to
help an interviewee focus on the time in question.96 Regarding
the substance of questioning, forensic clinicians may opt to
only question a collateral informant about topics with which
the collateral informant is well informed. Any adjustments
made to an interview based on personal characteristics of a col-
lateral informant should be noted in the forensic evaluator’s
report.
LEGAL STATUS OF TPI
Although forensic clinicians may recognize the importance
of TPI, legal professionals will recognize that TPI often consti-
tutes hearsay evidence, which is generally inadmissible.97
Thus, legal professionals may have concerns about using TPI,
given the law’s preference for evidence that can be subjected to
accuracy-testing procedures such as cross-examination; that is
collected via generally accepted techniques; and that was orig-
inally obtained consistent with Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment requirements.98 The fields of forensic psychology
and forensic psychiatry are clear, however, that TPI
“enhanc[es] the integrity of the process, the impartiality of the
evaluator, and the weight given the results by the trier of
fact.”99 This view is consistent with that of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The rationale . . . is that the expert is fully capable of
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis for
his opinion . . . [b]ecause of his professional background,
knowledge, and experience. . . . [T]he expert [knows
how] to separate the wheat from the chaff and to use only
those sources and kinds of information which are of a
type reasonably relied upon by similar experts in arriving
at sound opinions on the subject. . . . Upon admission of
such evidence . . . the court . . . [will] instruct the jury
that the hearsay evidence [and other inadmissible evi-
dence] is to be considered solely as a basis for the expert
opinion and not as substantive evidence.100
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The relevant federal and state standards will be described in
the following sections. These standards are summarized in
Table 3.
LEGAL STATUS IN THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Experts providing testimony in federal court are governed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 allows experts to
present opinions based on information of which they have
“been made aware” before trial—for example, via third par-
ties.101 In this way, expert witnesses are distinguished from lay
witnesses, who are typically restricted to testifying about their
personal observations to avoid conveying out-of-court infor-
mation in violation of hearsay rules.102 According to this Rule,
expert opinions based on such out-of-court information may
be admitted, even if those facts or data underlying the opinion
would be inadmissible, as long as other experts in the field
would reasonably rely on the same type of information.103
This aspect of Rule 703 has not changed substantially since
the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence 40 years
ago, at a time when common-law rules of evidence were far
more limiting to experts.104 Developers of Federal Rule 703
sought to allow for experts to engage in their standard prac-
tices, most notably the practice of relying on outside informa-
tion to make informed conclusions, without burdening courts
by requiring that all such information be admitted into evi-
dence.105
Following the creation of Rule 703, expert-opinion testi-
mony could no longer be excluded from federal court solely
because it was based on inadmissible evidence (e.g., third-
party information and other hearsay). Instead, judges would
first need to determine whether other experts in the relevant
field would reasonably rely on the same kind of facts and
data.106 Some scholars described reasonable reliance as a “low
threshold,”107 with many courts inclined to accept an expert’s
assertion that such information was reasonably relied upon.108
However, several other courts interpreted the rule as requiring
judges to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of the underlying facts
or data before deciding if it was reasonably relied upon.109 If a
judge determined that the expert relied on untrustworthy
information to form his or her opinion, that reliance became
inherently unreasonable, and the expert’s opinion would be
excluded under Rule 703.110 In this way, judges used the added
trustworthiness component to avoid entirely abdicating their
gatekeeper role to experts—and provide additional protection
against lawyers using experts to bypass evidentiary restric-
tions.111
Although the original version of Rule 703 indicated that
experts may share their opinions—even if they are based on
inadmissible evidence—through testimony, experts are also
expected to describe how they formed their opinions and what
information they considered in reaching them.112 However, the
initial iteration of Rule 703 did not indicate what restrictions
should apply to an expert’s testimonial discussion of the inad-
missible facts or data underlying an opinion. As a result, schol-
arly debates emerged and circuits split.113 Few courts inter-
preted Rule 703 as allowing the effectively unrestricted admis-
sion of such inadmissible information via expert testimony
because of its use as the basis for an opinion, often viewing the
rule as another hearsay exception.114 More commonly, federal
courts permitted the introduction of inadmissible background
information for the limited purpose of explaining how an
expert formulated his or her opinion, not as statements of
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TABLE 3
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Federal Rule
Post-
amendment 
FRE
Fed. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Alabama
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ala. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference
to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect.
Alaska
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Alaska R. Evid. 
703; 705(c)
703: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. Facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence, but must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.
705(c): When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
other than to explain or support the expert’s opinion or inference, the court shall exclude the
underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for an improper purpose outweighs
their value as support for the expert’s opinion. If the facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a
limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request.
Arizona
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ariz. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Arkansas
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ark. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
California
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Cal. Evid. 
Code §§ 
801, 804
801: If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to
such an opinion as is: (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience
that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and (b) Based on matter (including
his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally
known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissi-
ble, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon
the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such
matter as a basis for his opinion.
804: (a) If a witness testifying as an expert testifies that his opinion is based in whole or in part
upon the opinion or statement of another person, such other person may be called and examined
by any adverse party as if under cross-examination concerning the opinion or statement.
(b) This section is not applicable if the person upon whose opinion or statement the expert wit-
ness has relied is (1) a party, (2) a person identified with a party within the meaning of subdivi-
sion (d) of Section 776, or (3) a witness who has testified in the action concerning the subject
matter of the opinion or statement upon which the expert witness has relied.
(c) Nothing in this section makes admissible an expert opinion that is inadmissible because it is
based in whole or in part on the opinion or statement of another person.
(d) An expert opinion otherwise admissible is not made inadmissible by this section because it is
based on the opinion or statement of a person who is unavailable for examination pursuant to
this section.
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115. See, e.g., Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254,
1261-62 (9th Cir. 1984) (admitting reports described as hearsay
solely to explain how an expert reached an opinion, not to show
the truth of the information within the reports); Bauman v. Cen-
tex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding error with trial
court’s decision to exclude psychological testimony until after
defendant had testified “because there is no requirement that the
opinion be based on the evidence at trial”).
116. See, e.g., Paddack, 745 F.2d at 1262.
117. Such rules include the balancing test in FED. R. EVID. 403 and
the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Const. amend, 6. See Bar-
rel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028,
1033 (5th Cir. 1984); Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21
F.3d 721, 728-29 (6th Cir. 1994); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1981).
118. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
119. Id.
120. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 3 (2004).
122. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
123. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
124. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
125. Id. at 2228.
126. Id. at 2238.
127. Id. at 2243.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2259.
130. Id.
131. See infra Table 3 for a list of relevant state statutes and caselaw.
fact.115 Often such opinions suggested that judges should
instruct jurors that otherwise inadmissible information should
be used solely to help them evaluate the expert’s opinion and
not as substantive evidence in the case.116 Finally, other courts
explicitly recognized that whereas an expert’s testimony about
the bases of his or her opinions might be admissible under
Rule 703, such admission might still conflict with other evi-
dentiary and constitutional rules—and therefore should be
prohibited.117
In response to the circuits’ split over whether experts should
be allowed to disclose the underlying bases for their opinions if
they include inadmissible evidence, Rule 703 was amended in
2000.118 The amended rule seemed to align with those circuits
that explicitly referenced the potential for Rule 703 to be super-
seded by Rule 403, mandating that inadmissible information
not be disclosed to the jury unless the court finds that its pro-
bative value in helping the factfinder evaluate the expert’s opin-
ion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.119
Since the 2000 amendment to Rule 703, there have been
several noteworthy U.S. Supreme Court decisions relevant to
the introduction of third-party information. In Crawford v.
Washington,120 the United States Supreme Court held that any
testimonial out-of-court statements are barred unless the wit-
ness is currently unavailable but had previously been available
for the defendant to cross-examine. The Court related this
requirement to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
granting defendants the right to confront their accusers regard-
less of whether the court deemed the information reliable. This
interpretation was a departure from the previous Supreme
Court decision in Ohio v. Roberts,121 which described several
exceptions to the hearsay clause that were eschewed under
Crawford.
One of the residual questions not addressed in Crawford was
the nature of “testimonial” evidence. This was addressed by the
Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,122 where the Court defined
a document developed for evidentiary purposes, in this case a
blood-alcohol-analysis report, as “testimonial” under the mean-
ing of the Confrontation Clause. The document was therefore
excluded, despite the Court’s recognition of its reliability. How-
ever, Rule 703 itself did not seem to change in response to these
Supreme Court rulings; other than a slight modification in con-
junction with a rules-wide restyling in 2011, it has remained
substantively the same since the addition of the balancing test
weighing probative value and prejudicial effect.123
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Williams v. Illinois,124 holding that testimony need not be
accusatory—and can even be impartial and scientific—to be
covered under the Crawford reading of the Confrontation
Clause.125 The Court added that the Confrontation Clause
does not prohibit irrelevant evidence from being admitted as
part of expert testimony, identifying testimonial statements
that are unavailable for cross-examination as the central issue
of previous cases.126 The Court instructed trial judges to con-
sider the purpose that a reasonable person would attribute to
the statement in question to determine whether facts or data
underlying an expert’s opinion are prohibited by the Con-
frontation Clause.127
In Williams, the Court noted that the DNA profile in ques-
tion was used to apprehend a suspect but not to obtain evi-
dence against a defendant; therefore, the profile did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause.128 Justice Thomas concurred in
judgment, stating that “[i]t is no answer to say that ‘safe-
guards’ in the rules of evidence will prevent the abuse of basis
testimony” and that the “balancing test is no substitute for a
constitutional provision that has already struck the balance in
favor of the accused.”129 Justice Thomas also observed that
reputable experts within the mental-health field frequently
rely upon third-party information that would qualify as
hearsay.130
LEGAL STATUS IN STATE JURISDICTIONS
State jurisdictions can create their own rules regarding
third-party information. Many have implemented—via statute
or caselaw—rules similar to a previous or current version of
Federal Rule 703, while others have created their own rules
governing this type of evidence.131
STATE RULES SIMILAR TO PRE-AMENDMENT VERSION
OF FRE 703 
Statutes or caselaw from 19 states appear to apply a TPI-
related rule that is substantively similar to the original iteration
of Federal Rule 703 (before the amendment in 2000 that added
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TABLE 3 (continued)
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Colorado
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Colo. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be dis-
closed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Connecticut
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Conn. Code Evid. 
§ 7-4(b)
(b) Bases of opinion testimony by experts. The facts in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the proceeding. The facts need not be admissible in evidence if of a type customarily relied on
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions on the subject. The facts relied on pur-
suant to this subsection are not substantive evidence, unless otherwise admissible as such evi-
dence.
Delaware
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
(however,
Delaware
requires party
who wants to
exclude
expert-basis
information
from the jury
to raise the
issue by
objection)
Del. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or infer-
ence to be admitted. Upon objection, facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Florida
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.704
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial. If the facts or data are of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible may not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Georgia
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 24-7-703
The facts or data in the particular proceeding upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, such facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opin-
ion or inference to be admitted. Such facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Hawaii
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness
component 
Haw. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The court may, how-
ever, disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Idaho
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Idaho R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be dis-
closed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
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132. These states include Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Of note, Louisiana
maintains different standards for the civil and criminal context;
although the civil-court rule mimics the pre-amendment version
of Rule 703 verbatim, the state’s criminal courts only allow an
expert to discuss inadmissible information during cross-exami-
nation. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 705.
133. FED. R. EVID. 703, 705. Illinois and Indiana serve as other, some-
what less concrete examples, as both states created/amended
their relevant rules after the 2011 restyling of the federal rules
and still chose not to include the balancing test. See ILL. R. EVID.
703; IND. R. EVID. 703.
134. See supra p. 24, 26 for a discussion of this distinction.
135. Meins v. Meins, 93 Ark. App. 292, 301, 218 S.W.3d 366, 368,
371 (2005).
136. Id. (quoting Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 67 Ark. App. 66, 992 S.W.2d
162 (1999)). See also Miller v. State, 2010 Ark. 1, 27, 362 S.W.3d
264, 281-82 (2010) (permissible for trial court to allow psy-
chologist to testify as to defendant’s prior acts of violence to
explain “critical” background information used during his
forensic evaluation of defendant). But see Bowen v. State, 322
Ark. 483, 514-15, 911 S.W.2d 555, 570-71 (1995) (permissible
for trial court to deny expert reading a psychosocial history of
defendant based on interviews with third parties because the
“only purpose for offering the statements . . . was for the truth
of the matter asserted”).
137. See State v. Hayden, 233 Neb. 211, 215, 444 N.W.2d 317, 321
(1989) (“We conclude that the statements complained of were
admitted as foundation for Dr. Woytassek’s diagnosis and opin-
ion that defendant was mentally ill and dangerous.”); State v.
Simants, 248 Neb. 581, 586, 537 N.W.2d 346, 350 (1995)
(“Because the State’s exhibits were not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted therein, but instead were relied upon to provide
a basis for expert testimony pursuant to rule 703, the district
court did not err by admitting the exhibits into evidence.”).
138. See State v. Hayden, 237 Neb. 286, 466 N.W.2d 66 (1991).
139. ALA R. EVID. 703.
140. N.M.R. EVID. 11-703.
141. E.g., State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 159 P.3d 531 (2007); State v.
Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141, 776 P.2d 1067 (1989).
142. Vega v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 45 So. 3d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
143. DEL. R. EVID. 703.
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-458.
the “probative value vs. prejudicial effect” balancing test).132
Some of these states may have simply failed to update their
statutes in accordance with the changing federal rule, but oth-
ers appear to have intentionally implemented a rule that omits
the balancing test. For example, the Pennsylvania rule’s advi-
sory-committee notes indicate that the state deliberately did
not include such a balancing test in its statute because it con-
flicts with another rule of evidence in Pennsylvania, requiring
that facts and data underlying an expert’s opinion be disclosed
to the trier of fact.133 However, the omission of a balancing test
that instructs judges how to decide whether to admit testi-
mony about inadmissible evidence underlying an expert’s
opinion necessarily results in some ambiguity regarding how
to resolve such a question. As a result, many of these states
apply their relevant evidentiary rules in a manner similar to the
federal jurisdiction—before the amendment of Rule 703—that
permitted an expert to testify regarding inadmissible back-
ground information for the limited purpose of explaining how
he or she formulated an opinion, and not as a statement of
fact.134
For example, an Arkansas Court of Appeals case affirmed
the decision to allow a social worker to present information
disclosed to her during her treatment of children involved in a
custody dispute that, if true, reflected negatively on one of the
parties.135 The court explained its decision, reasoning that the
children’s statements to the social worker contributed to the
formation of her expert opinion and that “an expert must be
allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the basis of facts for his
opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair
with little if any means for evaluating its correctness.”136 Addi-
tionally, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that, during
commitment proceedings, mental-health professionals may
include the results of interviews and examinations performed
by others—in addition to other forms of TPI—in their reports
when such information provides the basis for an expert’s opin-
ion.137 By extension, the court has also prohibited the inclu-
sion of such inadmissible information when submitted to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.138
STATE RULE SIMILAR TO POST-AMENDMENT VERSION
OF FRE 703 
Several states have rules of evidence that are substantively
similar to the current version of FRE 703. It appears that 18
states have such rules: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Although these state statutes vary
slightly in their wording, the requirements and restrictions on
otherwise inadmissible facts or data are similar to the post-
amended version of FRE 703. For example, Alabama’s139 and
New Mexico’s140 relevant rules of evidence prohibit otherwise
inadmissible evidence unless the court determines that the
probative value in assisting the fact-finder to evaluate the
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect
of the evidence. After decades of steadfastly adhering to the
common-law standard, Alabama’s statute was recently changed
to mirror the post-amendment version of Federal Rule 703. A
brief review of the relevant caselaw indicates that Arizona per-
mits experts to testify as to previous reports or medical opin-
ions that contributed to the formulating of their own opin-
ions.141 Florida has also held that experts are entitled to rely on
hearsay evidence when forming their opinions on issues rele-
vant to a case.142
Some states include all of the relevant parts of FRE 703 but
add additional qualifiers or requirements. For example,
Delaware requires an objection to invoke the prevention of
inadmissible evidence as outlined in FRE 703.143 Additionally,
the relevant statute in Kansas was recently amended to add the
restrictions for otherwise inadmissible evidence.144 These
amendments are effective as of July 1, 2014. It should be noted
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FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Illinois
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ill. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Indiana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Ind. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed. Experts may testify to opinions based on inadmissible evi-
dence, provided that it is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Iowa
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Iowa Code Ann.
R. 5.703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Kansas
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-458
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible into evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that the probative
value of such facts or data in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs any prejudicial effect.
Kentucky
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Ky. R. Evid. 
703
(a) The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts
or data relied upon by an expert pursuant to subdivision (a) may at the discretion of the court
be disclosed to the jury even though such facts or data are not admissible in evidence. Upon
request the court shall admonish the jury to use such facts or data only for the purpose of
evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or inference.
Louisiana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
La. Code Evid.
Ann. art. 703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Maine
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Me. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Maryland
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Md. R. Evid. 
5-703
(a) In General. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Disclosure to Jury. If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and
unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an expert pursuant to section (a) may, in
the discretion of the court, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and data are not admissi-
ble in evidence. Upon request, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only
for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert’s opinion or infer-
ence.
Massachusetts
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can
only rely on
admissible
evidence
Com. v. 
Markvart, 437
Mass. 331, 337,
771 N.E.2d 778,
783 (2002)
Qualified examiners, as expert witnesses, may base their opinions on (1) facts personally
observed; (2) evidence already in the records or which the parties represent will be admitted
during the course of the proceedings, assumed to be true in questions put to the expert wit-
nesses; and (3) “facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible and
are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion.”
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145. The Oklahoma statute was briefly invalidated for violation of the
Oklahoma Constitution’s single-subject bill. See Douglas v. Cox
Retirement Properties, Inc., 302 P.3d 789 (Okla. 2013). But the
Oklahoma Legislature reenacted the provision, 12 Okla. Stat.
Ann. § 2703, later in 2013. See 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, 1st Extra-
ordinary Sess., chapter 15, §§ 5, 6.
146. Those states include Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, and Ten-
nessee. 
147. HAW. R. EVID. 703.
148. TENN. R. EVID. 703.
149. HAW. R. EVID. 703; TENN. R. EVID. 703. However, Hawaii’s statute
indicates that a judge may disallow such testimony, while Ten-
nessee’s statute notes that a judge shall disallow such testimony.
Id.
150. KY. R. EVID. 703.
151. MD. R. EVID. 5-703. 
152. KY. R. EVID. 703.; MD. R. EVID. 5-703.
153. State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 409-10 (Tenn. 2009).
154. Rabovsky v. Com., 973 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Ky. 1998). As discussed
supra, judges in Kentucky state courts may only allow experts to
disclose inadmissible facts or data underlying their opinions if
those data are “determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illu-
minate testimony, and unprivileged.” KY. R. EVID. 703.
155. These states include Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio. Addi-
tionally, as discussed infra, Virginia limits the bases of expert
opinions in criminal cases to “facts personally known or
observed by the expert, or based upon facts in evidence.” VA.
SUP. CT. R. 2:703(b). In civil cases, however, the applicable rule
tracks the pre-2000-amendment version of Federal Rule 703. VA.
SUP. CT. R. 2:703(a).
156. OHIO R. EVID. 703.
157. State v. Solomon, 59 Ohio St. 3d 124, 126, 570 N.E.2d 1118,
1120 (1991) (holding that mental-health professionals may
review non-admitted police reports and hospital records when
formulating their opinions and still testify in accordance with
Rule 703); see also Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 2005-Ohio-
4787, 106 Ohio St. 3d 237, 240, 834 N.E.2d 323, 327 (“we have
acknowledged that information that would not be admissible at
trial may serve as a basis for an expert’s background knowledge
without violating Evid.R. 703.”).
158. MICH. R. EVID. 703. For example, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan noted that a trial court could properly exclude a psycholo-
gist’s testimony that was based, in large part, on inadmissible
hearsay statements from the defendant. People v. Yost, 483 Mich.
856, 759 N.W.2d 196 (2009).
159. Com. v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 337, 771 N.E.2d 778, 783
(2002).
160. See Com. v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 577, 745 N.E.2d 320, 322
(2001).
161. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801, 804.
that one of the rules of evidence that strongly resembles the
FRE is that in Oklahoma.145
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: ADDING TRUST-
WORTHINESS COMPONENT 
Four states have explicitly included some form of a trust-
worthiness component in their versions of the evidentiary
rule.146 Specifically, rules in Hawaii147 and Tennessee148 note
that a court has the power to prohibit opinion testimony “if the
underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.”149
Additionally, relevant rules from both Kentucky150 and Mary-
land151 require that typically inadmissible underlying facts be
“trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivi-
leged” before experts can disclose them to the jury.152 Indicat-
ing how a court might identify untrustworthy supporting data,
the Tennessee Supreme Court noted:  
A foundation built upon facts contrary to known
undisputed facts, facts that do not adequately support the
conclusion, or assumptions that neither reasonably arise
from an expert’s expertise or inferences that can reason-
ably be drawn from the evidence are examples of failings
that would render the facts relied upon by an expert
insufficiently trustworthy.153
Additionally, application of the trustworthiness component
of Kentucky’s rule resulted in that state’s supreme court over-
turning a murder conviction, holding that the trial court
should not have allowed an expert to read from inadmissible
medical records without first addressing the three factual
determinations required by the state evidentiary rule.154
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: EXPERTS CAN ONLY
RELY ON ADMITTED OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
Harkening back to the days before the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, three states utilize statutes or caselaw prohibiting opin-
ions based on inadmissible and/or non-admitted evidence alto-
gether.155 Specifically, Ohio limits the basis of expert testimony
to include only those facts and data that the expert personally
perceived or are admitted into evidence.156 However, Ohio
courts seem to apply a somewhat liberal definition of “person-
ally perceived,” allowing experts to base their opinions on
background knowledge (i.e., via professional articles) and doc-
uments like police reports and medical records despite the fact
that they are not admitted into evidence.157 Similarly, Michigan
prohibits experts from basing their opinions on any facts or
data that are not, or will not be, admitted into evidence.158
Finally, although Massachusetts has not codified its rules of
evidence, its caselaw indicates that expert witnesses may only
base their opinions on personal observations; evidence that has
been, or will be, admitted; and “facts or data not in evidence if
the facts or data are independently admissible and are a per-
missible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opin-
ion.”159 Massachusetts also limits discussion of these underly-
ing facts to cross-examination, rather than allowing presenta-
tion during the expert’s direct examination.160
STATE RULE DISTINCT FROM FRE: OTHER 
There are six states that appear to depart significantly from
the standards articulated in FRE 703: California, Connecticut,
Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia. California’s
statute includes both the information found in FRE 702, which
describes the relevant requirements of expert testimony, and
that which is found in FRE 703.161 Notably, the California rule
differs substantially from both FRE 703 and other states’ evi-
dence rules in stating that although otherwise admissible
expert opinions are not made inadmissible because they are
based on hearsay evidence, nothing in the section makes an
expert opinion admissible where it would be inadmissible
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FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Michigan
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can only
rely on admissi-
ble 
evidence
Mich. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
shall be in evidence. This rule does not restrict the discretion of the court to receive expert
opinion testimony subject to the condition that the factual bases of the opinion be admitted in
evidence hereafter.
Minnesota
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
Minn. R. Evid. 
703
(a) The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Underlying expert data must be independently admissible in order to be received upon
direct examination; provided that when good cause is shown in civil cases and the underlying
data is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit the data under this rule for the limited
purpose of showing the basis for the expert’s opinion. Nothing in this rule restricts admissibil-
ity of underlying expert data when inquired into on cross-examination.
Mississippi
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Miss. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Missouri
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
State v. 
Woodworth, 
941 S.W.2d 679
(Mo. Ct. App.
W.D. 1997)
“An expert witness is entitled to rely on hearsay evidence to support an opinion so long as
that evidence is of the type reasonably relied upon by other experts in that field, and such evi-
dence need not be independently admissible. Any expert witness represents the distillation of
the total of his personal experiences, readings, studies and learning in his field of expertise,
and he may rely on that background, hearsay or not, as basis for his opinion” (internal cita-
tions and quotations omitted).
Montana
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Mont. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Nebraska
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 27-703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Nevada
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 50.285
1. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
2. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
New 
Hampshire
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.H.R. Evid. 
5-703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
New Jersey
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.J.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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162. Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
833 (1992); People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555, 161 P.3d 104
(2007).
163. CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-4(b).
164. Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
165. MINN. R. EVID. 703.
166. MINN. R. EVID. 703, Supreme Court Advisory Notes. 
167. People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727 (2005).
168. People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169 (1974).
169. R.I. R. EVID. 703.
170. E.g., State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101 (R.I. 2014).
171. See State v. Huffman, 68 A.3d 558 (R.I. 2013).
172. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:703.
173. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:705(a).
174. Id.
because it is based in whole or in part on the opinion or state-
ment of another person. Based on existing caselaw, it appears
that reliability of the inadmissible evidence is a significant fac-
tor in determining whether the expert testimony using it is
admissible.162
Connecticut requires that the facts underlying an expert’s
opinion be a type customarily relied on by experts in a partic-
ular field in order to be introduced when otherwise inadmissi-
ble.163 Connecticut additionally distinguishes between those
facts relied upon for expert testimony and substantive evi-
dence unless that information relied upon may also be admis-
sible. Unlike FRE 703, Connecticut’s statute does not include
a balancing test weighing the prejudicial impact of the evi-
dence against its probative value. Similar to California caselaw,
Connecticut courts have interpreted the statute to require that
experts disclose the facts underlying their opinions before they
may render the opinion itself.164
Minnesota’s statute closely resembles the pre-2000 FRE 703
but differs in distinguishing information admissible on direct
examination versus cross-examination.165 While underlying
expert data must be admissible on its own to be introduced on
direct examination, the statute explicitly states that the rule
does not restrict the admissibility of underlying data when this
information is challenged on cross-examination. If the expert
can show the underlying information to be particularly trust-
worthy, then the rule does permit evidence to be introduced for
a limited purpose. The issue of trustworthiness is left to the
presiding judge, who must be satisfied that the information
relied upon by the expert is sufficiently reliable to ensure the
validity of the expert’s opinion.166
Unlike other states, New York does not have a particular
statute addressing the issue of third-party information in
expert testimony. The state also diverges from other states in its
strict adherence to Confrontation Clause principles and its
holding that even when hearsay evidence is reliable, it remains
inadmissible when the defendant is denied the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.167 This holding does not appear
to prohibit experts from relying on third-party information but
only from relaying that information to the court—based upon
established precedent permitting this reliance.168 However, it
should be noted that Goldstein was decided after the United
States Supreme Court’s landmark case of Crawford v. Washing-
ton. Therefore, Goldstein may be considered the progeny of
Crawford and may reflect a revised approach to third-party
information in the context of expert evidence. 
Under Rhode Island’s rules of evidence, any facts or data rea-
sonably and customarily relied upon by experts are admissible
even without testimony from the declarant.169 Although the
rule itself does not require a balancing test, some state cases
have nonetheless examined the probative value versus the prej-
udicial impact of the evidence.170 This appears to be particularly
applicable when the expert relied upon an alleged victim’s
reports—and the expert’s reliance upon the victim may be inter-
preted as an implicit affirmation of the victim’s credibility.171
Although most state rules of evidence have language applic-
able to both criminal and civil law, Virginia explicitly distin-
guishes between the two.172 While the Virginia statute notes
that evidence of a type typically relied upon by other experts
in a particular field need not be admissible on its own in civil
contexts, it does not have parallel language in criminal cases.
Rather, evidence relied upon in a criminal case should be
either personally known or observed by the expert or inde-
pendently introduced into evidence. Virginia also has a statute
related specifically to disclosure of facts or data utilized in
expert testimony, and this rule also distinguishes between the
requirements in civil cases versus criminal cases.173 Although
the statute requires that facts relied upon by the expert be dis-
closed in a criminal case, there is no such requirement in the
civil context unless specifically ordered by the court or elicited
upon cross-examination.174
CONCLUSION
The use of third-party information in FMHA appears
strongly supported within the fields of forensic psychology and
forensic psychiatry. Among other contributions, the incorpora-
tion of third-party information helps to promote overall accu-
racy, detect bias from other sources, enhance impartiality, and
increase credibility. But the relevant law on the admissibility of
such third-party information as part of expert evaluations on
criminal, civil, and family-law matters varies considerably.
Before the revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2000,
the rules allowed the admission of TPI for the purpose of con-
tributing to the expert’s opinion—although not for adding to
evidence on matters that are not part of this opinion. Some 19
states currently have TPI-admissibility rules that are substan-
tively similar to the pre-revision version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The 2000 FRE revision added a “prejudicial versus
probative” test in considering whether TPI should be admitted
as part of expert evaluations; this is the current federal stan-
dard, which has also been adopted by 18 states. Three states
allow TPI to be admitted only when it is a part of evidence that
has already been admitted or would otherwise be admissible.
Four states have applied a “trustworthiness” criterion to the
TPI-admissibility question, and the remaining six states have
rules that are distinct from all of these categories. Courts and
practitioners should be aware of both the importance of third-
party information and the relevant law regarding its admissi-
bility in their jurisdiction to observe the indicated balancing
test for the appropriate use of this important source of infor-
mation in forensic mental-health assessment.
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New
Mexico
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.M.R. Evid. 
11-703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
New York
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
People v. Sugden,
35 N.Y.2d 453
(1974); People v.
Goldstein, 6
N.Y.3d 119 (2005)
Expert may provide opinions based on hearsay information “if it is of a kind accepted in
the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” (People v. Sugden). But,
experts may not relay statements from third parties to jury when those third parties
cannot be cross-examined; doing so would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause (People v. Goldstein).
North
Carolina
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.C.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
North
Dakota
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
N.D.R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
Ohio
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Experts can only
rely on admissi-
ble or admitted 
evidence
Ohio R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.
Oklahoma
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
12 Okl. St. Ann.
§ 2703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Oregon
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40.415
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Pennsylvania
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Pa. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.
Rhode Island
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other
R.I.R. Evid. 
703
An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical question, facts or data perceived by
the expert at or before the hearing, or facts or data in evidence. If of a type reasonably
and customarily relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon
the subject, the underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the
primary source.
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TABLE 3 (continued)
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
South 
Carolina
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
S.C.R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
South
Dakota
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
S.D. Codified
Laws § 19-
15-3
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Tennessee
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Adds trust-
worthiness 
component 
Tenn. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Texas
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Tex. R. Evid. 
703; 705(d)
703: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by, reviewed by, or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admis-
sible in evidence.
705(d): When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence, the court
shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for a pur-
pose other than as explanation or support for the expert’s opinion outweighs their value
as explanation or support or are unfairly prejudicial. If otherwise inadmissible facts or
data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon
request.
Utah
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Utah R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would other-
wise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
Vermont
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Vt. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inad-
missible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Virginia
Differs from 
FRE 703:
Other 
Va. Sup. Ct. R.
2:703
(a) Civil cases. In a civil action an expert witness may give testimony and render an
opinion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances, or data made known to or per-
ceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which the witness is
called upon to testify. The facts, circumstances, or data relied upon by such witness in
forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in
the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not
be admissible in evidence.
(b) Criminal cases. In criminal cases, the opinion of an expert is generally admissible
if it is based upon facts personally known or observed by the expert, or based upon
facts in evidence.
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TABLE 3 (continued)
FEDERAL AND STATE RULES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RELIED UPON BY EXPERT WITNESSES
JURISDICTION CATEGORY
RELEVANT RULE
OR CASE
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE OR CASE
Washington
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wash. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
West
Virginia
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
W. Va. R. Evid. 
703
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reason-
ably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially out-
weighs their prejudicial effect.
Wisconsin
Substantively 
similar to 
post-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wis. Stat. Ann.
907.03
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible may not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opin-
ion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the
jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion or inference substantially outweighs their prejudi-
cial effect.
Wyoming
Substantively 
similar to 
pre-
amendment 
FRE 703
Wyo. R. Evid. 
703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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Footnotes
Editor’s Note: This article was initially submitted as part of a writing
competition for law students sponsored by the International Associa-
tion of LGBT Judges. Saltry’s entry won first place and was then sub-
mitted to Court Review for publication consideration.
1. “[T]ipstaff. A court crier. The name derives from the crier’s former
practice of holding a staff tipped with silver as a badge of office.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
2. Much of the analysis in this paper is geared toward sexual orien-
tation. While issues surrounding gender identity and jury service
would make for equally important reading, that discussion is
omitted here.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERI-
CAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 8 (1988).
6. See In Penn’s Case, 6 Howell’s St. Trials 951 (1670); id. at 9-10. See
also In Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1671).
7. Google Translate, https://translate.google.com/#en/fr/See,
https://translate.google.com/#en/fr/Say.
8. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 195 (1969).
Friday mornings in the Philadelphia Court of CommonPleas are unofficially designated as civil-jury days. Thevast majority of jury panels leaving the Juanita Kidd Stout
Center for Criminal Justice and heading over to City Hall on
Friday mornings are listed for civil cases—anything from
motor-vehicle accidents and contract disputes to complex
medical-malpractice and products-liability cases. These pan-
elists—not always bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, though more
often than not awake and attentive—are Philadelphians of all
stripes. They come from all corners of the city and are, for the
most part, pleasant folks. My job as judge’s tipstaff1 is to work
with these jurors by assisting the court and the litigants select-
ing juries and managing the courtroom. In my time at City
Hall, I have empanelled nearly 100 civil juries and as a result
can occasionally predict which side will strike which juror in
which order. This rarely happens, but after a few automobile-
accident cases, you get a feel for the types of experience or
beliefs that might bias a juror to a particular set of facts. As
prospective jurors answer the court’s questions, one may rea-
sonably characterize their answers as proxies for bias, and they
include such things as familiarity with claims investigation,
prior lawsuits, personal feelings regarding money-damage
awards, and the like. Using a juror’s stated experiences or
beliefs as a proxy for bias are permissible bases for excusing
that juror from serving on the jury by exercising a peremptory
challenge. 
But should litigants be permitted to exercise peremptory
challenges to prevent otherwise qualified people from serving
on a jury solely because of their sexual orientation?2 While
many argue that sexual orientation should never be a proxy for
bias, the law has yet to align itself with this view. A juror’s right
to serve free of discrimination based upon sexual orientation is
a developing concept, and while courts have rushed to secure
equal protection to same-sex couples seeking civil marriage
following the landmark U.S. v. Windsor3 decision, courts have
been less fleet-footed in securing similar protection for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) jurors. As of this writ-
ing, the Supreme Court has yet to decide on a standard of
review for evaluating equal-protection claims based on sexual
orientation, let alone the permissibility of exercising peremp-
tory challenges on that basis.
This paper discusses aspects of both the civil and criminal
court systems beginning in part I, which describes the voir dire
process generally—its background, purpose, and scope—as
well as an overview of the mechanics governing the process.
Part II highlights what limitations exist on the use of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude jurors based on their race and gen-
der. Part III covers current law regarding issues of sexual ori-
entation and peremptory challenges. Part IV discusses some of
the practical considerations at play regarding issues of sexual
orientation that manifest during voir dire as well as evaluating
several alternatives to the use of peremptory challenges. The
paper concludes by asking whether sexual orientation should
be protected under the line of cases stemming from Batson v.
Kentucky, arguing that sexual orientation deserves the protec-
tions of heightened scrutiny and the protections afforded
under Batson.4 Throughout the paper, intermingled with tradi-
tional citations, I have provided personal anecdotes that may
offer insight into the practical effects of the legal and policy
issues described. This commentary is not offered as expert
knowledge, and it is included solely for the benefit and enter-
tainment of the reader.
I. VOIR DIRE: THE PROCESS
The jury system originated in England sometime in the
twelfth century.5 Beginning as a rubberstamp for the king’s
wishes, juries gradually developed independence in decision
making over the succeeding centuries.6 The jury-selection
process known as “voir dire”—from the French words “to see”
and “to say,”7 often translated to mean “to speak the truth”8—
What’s (Who You) Love 
Got to Do with It?*
Should Sexual Orientation Be a Permissible 
Basis for Peremptory Challenges?
Colin P. Saltry
36 Court Review - Volume 51  
9. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 22-23 (1986).
10. Id. at 21-44.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968). 
12. Id. at §§ 1861-62.
13. Dean A. Stowers, Note, Juror Bias Undiscovered During Voir Dire:
Legal Standards for Reviewing Claims of a Denial of the Constitu-
tional Rights to an Impartial Jury, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 201, 202 (1989-
90).
14. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(“The trial judge exercises substantial control over voir dire in the
federal system. . . . The judge determines the range of information
that may be discovered about a prospective juror, and so affects
the exercise of both challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges. . . . The judge oversees the exclusion of jurors for cause,
in this way determining which jurors remain eligible for the exer-
cise of peremptory strikes.”).
15. See Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.10 (2013) (“Jury service is an important
responsibility of citizenship, fundamental to our entire system of
justice. The courts cannot function unless citizens serve as jurors.
Thanks to jurors, our society resolves its disputes in a civilized
manner, in a courtroom where citizens decide upon a verdict. . . .
Thank you for serving your country in this most important role.
We are about to select [insert number] jurors and [insert number]
alternate jurors to try a civil case.”).
16. Id. at § 1.40.
17. Id. at § 1.50.
18. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991) (holding that the
questioning of potential jurors in groups of four does not violate
Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury).
19. Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.10 (2013).
20. Paul N. Luvera, Truth or Consequences—Is Voir Dire Really a Waste
of Time?, 43 WASH. ST. B. NEWS., May 1989, at 11.
21. Nancy L. Alvarez, Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impar-
tial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
959, 961 (1982) (“A challenge for cause may be exercised when
counsel has reason to believe that a prospective juror will not be
able to view the evidence at trial in an impartial manner due to
some previous experience or some fixed attitude, such as an
admitted bias.”).
22. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause protects a defendant from jurors who are actually inca-
pable of rendering an impartial verdict”) and MICHAEL T. NIETZEL
& RONALD C. DILLEHAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN THE
COURTROOM 17-18 (1986) (providing examples of incompetency
to serve, including inability to speak or understand English, phys-
ical or mental disability, certain types of felony convictions, and
lack of U.S. citizenship or residence in the court’s jurisdiction).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) (not specifying a limit: “[a]ll chal-
lenges for cause . . . shall be determined by the court”).
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (setting the number of peremptory chal-
lenges available in a criminal case at 20 for capital cases, 6 for the
government with 10 for the defendant(s) in any other felony case
with a term of imprisonment longer than one year, and 3 per side
in a misdemeanor case where the crime is punishable by fine, one
year or less imprisonment, or both), FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b), and 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) (granting three peremptory challenges for
each side in civil case). 
saw its first American iteration as part of the Massachusetts
Jury Selection Law of 1760.9 That law allowed the questioning
of potential jurors until their names were formally printed as
part of the sheriff ’s jury list.10 As voir dire spread from New
England to the rest of the colonies and eventually the United
States, the process developed more structure. But two cen-
turies of common-law development created disparities in voir
dire practices and procedures between jurisdictions. So much
so that in 1968, Congress mandated uniform procedures for
the federal courts as part of the Jury Selection and Service
Act.11 The JSSA provides in part that “all citizens shall have
the opportunity to serve as jurors” and that “no citizen shall
be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror . . . on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or eco-
nomic status.”12
Contemporary voir dire is mostly a question-and-answer
session conducted by the court.13 The process is conducted
exclusively by the trial judge or court personnel, by the trial
judge with varying levels of participation from the attorneys,
or entirely by the attorneys. The trial judge has wide discre-
tion in how voir dire is conducted.14 Generally speaking, the
process begins when the venire is brought into the courtroom,
where it receives a formal welcome from the judge,15 an intro-
duction of the parties, lawyers, and potential witnesses, a brief
overview of the process, and a description of the case to be
decided.16 The jurors take an oath to tell the truth, and the
questioning begins.17 Questioning is usually, but not always,
directed at the venire rather than individual jurors, though at
times the process may include both methods of questioning.18
Questions asked first are of a gen-
eral nature, usually about per-
sonal information like age; back-
ground; marital, family, and
employment status; area of resi-
dence; education level; prior jury
service; experience with a lawsuit;
and ability to be fair and impar-
tial.19 As the questions progress,
they tend to focus more on the
specific circumstances of the case
in question, provided that each
question is limited in scope to
elicit whether a juror could be fair
and impartial.20
Once questioning is completed, the parties then have an
opportunity to exercise challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges. A challenge for cause may be asserted by either
party to exclude biased21 or incompetent jurors.22 Parties chal-
lenging a juror for cause must articulate their reason for the
challenge. The trial judge has wide discretion in deciding chal-
lenges for cause, and such challenges are theoretically unlim-
ited in number.23 Peremptory challenges are exercised by the
parties once all challenges for cause have been resolved and the
court is nearly ready to seat the jury. In most circumstances,
parties exercising them need not articulate a reason for the
challenge, and as creatures of statute, they are limited in num-
ber.24 Once all challenges have been exercised, the remaining
jurors are seated in the jury box, they are sworn in, and the
[T]wo centuries
of common-law
development
created 
disparities in
void dire 
practices and
procedures
between 
jurisdictions.
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25. Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.90, 1.110, 1.130 (2013).
26. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed”).
27. U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved”). 
28. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984). 
29. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985). 
30. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (“[T]he Court
has unambiguously declared that the American concept of the
jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968) (“[A]ll liti-
gants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right
to . . . petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of
the community in the district or division wherein the court con-
venes.”)
31. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (“[W]e impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are
not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, . . . but the
jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which
juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably rep-
resentative thereof.”)
32. Id.
33. Id. at 94.
34. Id. at 97.
35. Id.
36. Id..
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
38. Id. at 415 (“We conclude that a defendant in a criminal case can
raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by
the prosecution because of their race.”).
39. Id. at 415 (“[T]o say that the race of the defendant may be rele-
vant to discerning bias in some cases does not mean that it will be
a factor in others, for race prejudice stems from various causes
and may manifest itself in different forms.”).
40. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
41. Id. at 59 (“We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the
ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”)
42. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
43. Id. at 129 (“[G]ender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality.”).
44. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622.
trial begins.25 Part II discusses the
limitations placed on the use of
peremptory challenges in greater
detail. 
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE
OF PEREMPTORIES
The Constitution mandates that
all criminal defendants receive a
public trial by an impartial jury26
and that all civil litigants receive
the same right to a jury trial.27 The
Supreme Court described an
impartial jury as having both indi-
vidual and group components. On
the individual level, the Court
stated that “a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court”28 and that the juror “will conscientiously apply the
law and find the facts.”29 On the group level, the Supreme
Court has determined that an impartial jury venire consists of
a fair cross-section of the community.30 This fair-cross-section
requirement adheres only to the composition of jury venires
and does not mandate the composition of petit juries.31
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to end the practice
of peremptory challenges exercised to discriminate against
jurors on the basis of race. In the landmark case Batson v. Ken-
tucky, the Court found that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges to strike black jurors violated the equal-protection
rights of those jurors excluded from the jury on the basis of
race.32 The Court articulated a three-part test to determine
whether a peremptory strike was motivated by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose. Batson’s first step requires a defendant
raising a challenge to make a prima facie showing that the gov-
ernment exercised its strikes in a pattern of discrimination. A
defendant may do this by demonstrating that they are “a mem-
ber of a cognizable racial group,” “that the prosecutor has exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire mem-
bers of the defendant’s race,” that the exercise was discrimina-
tory, and that “all of the relevant circumstances raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”33 If a
defendant establishes this prima facie case, step two shifts the
burden to the government, which must “come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.”34 The gov-
ernment does not, however, need to meet the same burden
necessary for establishing a challenge for cause.35 Step three
rests with the trial judge, who must consider all the relevant
circumstances and then “determine if the defendant has estab-
lished purposeful discrimination.”36 The analysis articulated in
Batson marked a historic departure from the traditionally “any-
thing goes” nature of the peremptory challenge. 
Following the Batson decision, the Court augmented its
reasoning to include members of one racial group to raise
third-party equal-protection claims on behalf of members of a
different racial group. In Powers v. Ohio,37 the Supreme Court
allowed a white defendant to assert the rights of black
venirepersons struck from the jury panel.38 Powers held that
the reverse of Batson is also true, that a prosecutor’s use of dis-
criminatory peremptory strikes raises the same due-process
claims for white and non-white defendants.39 Additionally,
Georgia v. McCollum40 required that criminal defendants
receive the same treatment regarding their discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges as their prosecutorial counter-
parts.41 Finally, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,42 the Supreme
Court extended the Batson inquiry to prevent gender discrim-
ination.43
Expanding upon Batson and Powers, the Court extended its
equal-protection arguments to civil cases.44 In Edmonson, the
Court found that a private litigant exercising a peremptory
The Court 
articulated a
three-part test 
to determine
whether a
peremptory
strike was 
motivated by a
racially 
discriminatory
purpose.
38 Court Review - Volume 51  
45. Id.
46. Id. at 621-22.
47. Id. at 624 (“When a lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the
judge advises the juror he or she has been excused . . . . The gov-
ernment summons jurors, constrains their freedom of movement,
and subjects them to public scrutiny and examination. . . . By
enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court ‘has
not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige being the [alleged] discrim-
ination.’ Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S., at 725,
81 S. Ct., at 862. In so doing, the government has ‘create[d] the
legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct,’ National
Collegiate Athletic Assn., 488 U.S., at 192, 109 S. Ct., at 462, and
in a significant way has involved itself with invidious discrimina-
tion.”).
48. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), but see U.S. v.
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991). 
49. See Windsor, supra note 3.
50. OUT OF THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN
AMERICA (Jeffrey Dupre 1998).
51. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 813 (2002).
52. Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Perempto-
ries, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231, 245 (1998).
53. SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d
471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014).
54. 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
55. Id. at 170 (“A defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first
step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”).
56. 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a Bat-
son challenge on the merits).
57. Id. at 240-66.
strike on the basis of race was impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause.45 In reaching that conclusion, the Court
had to determine whether private litigants in a civil case could
be considered state actors for the purposes of equal-protection
analysis. In a six-to-three decision, the Court found that a
party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges emanated from
state authority—in this case, congressional statute—and that
without the material assistance of the government—“reliance
on governmental assistance and benefits, performing a tradi-
tional governmental function, and the injury caused was
aggravated by the incidents of governmental authority”46—a
civil litigant’s use of peremptory strikes constituted state
action.  The Court in Edmonson, as it has throughout the Bat-
son line of cases, emphasized how the gravity of the harm done
by excluding jurors based upon their race is magnified by the
court system’s material participation.47
While it appears that groups and classes of individuals sub-
ject to heightened degrees of scrutiny—religion, national ori-
gin, etc.—would eventually receive the protections of the Bat-
son analysis, the Supreme Court has declined to extend Bat-
son’s protections beyond race and gender. Lower courts have
issued differing rulings on these subjects,48 and it remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court will extend the Batson
analysis to other groups subject to heightened scrutiny. In light
of this, should sexual orientation—which is technically not
subjected to heightened-scrutiny review49—receive actual
heightened scrutiny and with it the added protections afforded
under Batson? Part III makes the case for heightened scrutiny
and analyzes current law with respect to sexual orientation and
peremptory challenges.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
There can be no question that members of the LGBT com-
munity have long suffered discrimination in our society—
either passively through lost opportunities in employment and
housing or actively through violence and intimidation.50 As
such, classifying the LGBT community as a “cognizable group”
for purposes of a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim
can be assumed accurate. However, identifying the extent of
LGBT representation in a given population and their subse-
quent representation on jury
venires is all but impossible given
the complexities of identifying
members of the community absent
their “coming out” to the court.51
Because of this, Sixth Amendment
claims are likely doomed to fail.52
Thus, the only practical opportu-
nity to protect members of the
LGBT community from being sys-
tematically excluded from jury ser-
vice exists during the peremptory-
challenge phase of voir dire. 
While the Batson inquiry is
essentially the same, the Supreme Court began strengthening the
protections afforded under Batson in 2005 by altering steps one
and three of the Batson test. Step one requires a party challenging
a peremptory strike to make a prima facie case that the strike was
motivated by racial prejudice. Step two shifts the burden to the
striking party to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
strike. Step three requires the court to determine whether the
party challenging the strike has shown deliberate discrimination
based on the record and the totality of the circumstances.53 Fol-
lowing the 2005 decision in Johnson v. California,54 the party in
step one need only raise an inference of discrimination.55 The
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required pre-Johnson
was inappropriate because it forced the party to persuade the
court in step one that there was impermissible discrimination
present based upon a preponderance of the circumstances; essen-
tially confusing steps one and three of the analysis. The court’s
review in step three was vastly expanded by Miller-El v. Dretke
(Miller-El II).56 In Miller-El II, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the difficulty of determining a discriminatory purpose based on
the exercise of peremptory strikes from the perspective of trial
courts. The Court also listed a series of factors helpful in “ferret-
ing out”57 discriminatory peremptory challenges, including con-
ducting statistical analysis of stricken jurors, conducting com-
parative analysis of all jurors, noting any contrasting questions
between jurors of different racial backgrounds, any use of a “jury
shuffle” by a trial court, and whether the particular court or juris-
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58. Id.
59. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 522 U.S. 472 (2008) (reversing the trial
court’s refusal to grant a Batson challenge because the trial record
showed no evidence that the trial court ever conducted a credibil-
ity analysis of the striking party’s proffered neutral reason); and
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (holding that the attempt to
set aside the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor did not
strike a juror for racially discriminatory purposes did not satisfy
the requirements for granting a writ of habeas corpus under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
60. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Windsor, supra note 3.
61. 421 F.3d 758 (2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1126 (2006).
62. Id. at 769.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 765.
65. Id. at 766.
66. Id. at 769.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Supra note 53.
69. Id. at 483 (“Windsor requires that when state action discriminates
on the basis of sexual orientation, we must examine its actual pur-
poses and carefully consider the resulting inequality to ensure that
our most fundamental institutions neither send nor reinforce mes-
sages of stigma or second-class status. In short, Windsor requires
heighted scrutiny. Our earlier cases applying rational basis review
to classifications based on sexual orientation cannot be reconciled
with Windsor. (Citation omitted.) Because we are bound by con-
trolling, higher authority, we now hold that Windsor’s heightened
scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.”). 
70. Id. at 475 (“[H]ow [would] we know—I mean, the evil of Batson
is not that one person of a given group is excluded, but that every-
one is. And there is no way for us to know who is gay and who
isn’t here, unless somebody happens to say something. There
would be no real way to analyze it.”).
71. Id.
72. Id.
diction has a history of system-
atically excluding jurors for
racially discriminatory rea-
sons.58 Finally, the Supreme
Court held that appellate courts
need not defer to the trial court’s
credibility determinations
where the record fails to offer
evidence of credibility.59 In other
words, trial courts are only
accorded deference in their step-
three determinations when evi-
dence of credibility exists in the record. The combined effect of
these decisions has resulted in an overall strengthening of the
Batson analysis.
Despite these improvements, a juror’s right to serve free of
discrimination based upon sexual orientation is still a devel-
oping concept. The Supreme Court has yet to decide on a stan-
dard of review for evaluating equal-protection claims based on
sexual orientation,60 let alone the permissibility of exercising
peremptory challenges against people because of their sexual
orientation. Ambiguity reigns among the lower courts as well,
as is best illustrated in the contrasting views of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
A. United States v. Blaylock61
Eugene Blaylock—a gay man—and five other defendants
were indicted on federal drug-trafficking charges stemming
from a routine traffic stop in 2002. During jury selection, Blay-
lock raised a Batson challenge following one of the govern-
ment’s peremptory strikes, asserting that the juror was improp-
erly struck because of his sexual orientation.62 At the time, the
district court denied the challenge, suggesting that Batson was
not applicable to sexual orientation and that even if it was,
Blaylock had not made a prima facie showing of intentional
discrimination.63 Following trial, the jury acquitted Blaylock
on several charges but found him guilty of “aiding and abetting
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine,”64 a
judgment that carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 120
months in prison plus five years’ supervised release.65 On
appeal, Blaylock again raised a Batson challenge to the govern-
ment’s peremptory strike. In a unanimous panel decision, the
Court of Appeals held that the Eighth Circuit did not recognize
sexual orientation as a Batson classification and went on to
question the constitutionality of extending Batson to sexual
orientation.66 Further, the court reasoned that even if Batson
covered sexual orientation, Blaylock’s challenge would have
failed because the government’s stated reason for the challenge
went beyond mere pretextual language.67 In other words, Blay-
lock’s challenge failed to satisfy Batson’s first step in raising an
inference of impermissible discrimination.
B. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories68
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor,
the Ninth Circuit held that heightened-scrutiny review applied
to equal-protection claims involving sexual orientation.69 This
case involved a contract dispute between two pharmaceutical
companies—SmithKline Beecham Corp. (GSK) and Abbott
Laboratories (Abbott)—regarding the licensing and pricing of
HIV medication. During jury selection, under questioning
from the federal district court judge, one of the jurors—“Juror
B”—revealed that he had friends with HIV, that he was taking
either a GSK or Abbott medication, and, through the repeated
use of masculine pronouns, that he had a male partner. The
trial judge also used masculine pronouns when inquiring
about Juror B’s partner. Abbott’s attorney asked Juror B a total
of five questions regarding the types of medication at issue in
the case. Once individual voir dire was completed, Abbott
exercised its first peremptory challenge against Juror B. GSK
immediately raised a Batson challenge. In the ensuing discus-
sion between the court and counsel, the judge raised three
issues with GSK’s motion, including (1) whether Batson
applies to civil cases; (2) whether Batson ever applies to sexual
orientation; and (3) how the court would practically identify
those members of the venire who might be gay.70 In response,
Abbott’s attorney stated that he had “no idea whether [Juror B]
is gay or not.”71 Subsequently, the judge allowed the strike.72
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit conducted a Batson analysis of
GSK’s claim that Abbott improperly excluded Juror B because
of his sexual orientation. The court found that GSK had estab-
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73. Id. at 478-79. First, the court noted that Juror B was the only
venireperson to publicly identify himself as gay. Second, relying on
the language in Powers, the court believed that because of the high
level of concern in the gay community about price increases of HIV
drugs, the “potential for relying on impermissible stereotypes in the
process of selecting jurors was ‘particularly acute’ in this case.” Id.
at 476-77 (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140). Third, the attorney for
Abbott either did not or could not articulate a justification for the
strike when given an opportunity by the court. Finally, the court
found that the explanations offered on appeal were “pretextual.”
74. Id. at 479. 
75. Id. at 478-79.
76. Id. at 479.
77. Witt v. Department of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)
(articulating a three-factor analysis for interpreting the Lawrence
decision: first, that Lawrence “did not consider the possible ratio-
nal bases for the law in question as required for rational basis
review”; second, that it “required that a legitimate state interest
justify the harm imposed by the Texas law”; and third, that it
“must have applied heightened scrutiny because it cited and relied
on heightened scrutiny cases”).
78. SmithKline, supra note 53,  at 483-84 (“Witt tells us how to inter-
pret Windsor. Under that analysis, we are required by Windsor to
apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual ori-
entation for purposes of equal protection. . . . Thus, there can no
longer be any question that gays and lesbians are no longer a
‘group or class of individuals normally subject to “rational basis”
review’” (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143).
79. Id. at 486 (“As illustrated by this case, permitting a strike based on
sexual orientation would send the false message that gays and les-
bians could not be trusted to reason fairly on issues of great import
to the community or the nation. Strikes based on preconceived
notions of the identities, preferences, and biases of gays and lesbians
reinforce and perpetuate these stereotypes. . . . The history of exclu-
sion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the per-
vasiveness of stereotypes about the group leads us to conclude that
Batson applies to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation.”).
80. Id. at 489.
81. Id. at 475.
82. Yoshino, supra note 51, at 837. 
83. Personal Anecdote: During voir dire in a relatively simple motor-
vehicle-accident case having nothing to do with sexual orienta-
tion, plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a painfully tone-deaf display of
questioning.  A male juror who presented as gay arrived in judge’s
chambers for questioning during individual voir dire. After
informing the court that he was engaged to another male, plain-
tiff’s counsel continually used feminine pronouns when referring
to the juror’s fiancé despite the juror’s disclosure that his partner
was male. The juror was later selected to serve and ended up being
chosen as foreperson of the jury, which unanimously found in
favor of the defendant. Whether the two facts are related is
unclear; however, it is interesting to note the coincidence. 
lished a prima facie case of discrimination,73 concluded that
“the record persuasively demonstrate[d] that Juror B was
struck because of his sexual orientation,”74 and found that
Abbott’s proffered neutral explanations were a pretext for pur-
poseful discrimination.75 Having concluded that GSK met the
burden for sustaining a Batson challenge, the court had to
decide whether Batson itself prohibited strikes based on sexual
orientation.76 Based on an earlier Ninth Circuit case interpret-
ing the decision in Lawrence,77 the court held that Windsor
required application of heightened scrutiny to equal-protec-
tion claims based upon sexual orientation.78 Upon these con-
clusions, the court established that Batson applies to peremp-
tory strikes based on sexual orientation79 then reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial.80
The divergent approaches taken to Batson challenges by the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits demonstrate the ambiguity among
the lower courts. As more and more individuals decide to come
out and publicly acknowledge their sexuality, the more issues
of sexual orientation will appear in court, either for litigants,
their attorneys, or jurors hearing their cases. Part IV discusses
some practical considerations at play when sexual orientation
is an issue in the courtroom as well as alternate approaches to
the current peremptory regime. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATE
APPROACHES IN EXERCISING PEREMPTORIES
A. Practical Considerations
In cases where sexual orientation becomes an issue, it seems
natural to inquire about prospective jurors’ attitudes toward
gays and lesbians, their experiences with the LGBT commu-
nity, and possibly even their sexual orientations in the interests
of empanelling an impartial jury. As the judge in SmithKline
succinctly asked, “[h]ow [would] we know . . . who’s gay and
who isn’t here, unless some-
body happens to say some-
thing.”81 Setting aside the
juror’s privacy considerations,
the most obvious solution—
directly asking jurors their sex-
ual orientation—might also
yield the worst results. First,
asking a direct question does
not guarantee a direct answer.
Any would-be inquisitors
would have to deal with the
challenge of gay covering,82
and even if that could be over-
come thanks to a juror’s pre-
sentation, there would be no way to affirmatively identify jury
panelists as LGBT short of a “friend of Dorothy” T-shirt, secret
decoder ring, or similar foolishness. 
Imagine, for a moment, a situation in which a juror’s sex-
ual orientation is in dispute for purposes of a Batson chal-
lenge. A plaintiff ’s attorney may raise a challenge following
the peremptory strike of a juror who “seemed to be gay.” In
the ensuing colloquy, the attorneys argue—presumably based
on appearance (stereotypes)—over the prospective juror’s sex-
ual orientation. The judge would then have to determine
whether the juror was actually gay or if the totality of the cir-
cumstances raised an inference that the juror might be gay.
Imagine that the judge granted a Batson challenge on the juror
suspected of being gay, only to offend the juror who disclosed
that he was happily married to a woman. In seeking to deter-
mine a prospective juror’s sexual orientation without offend-
ing that juror, a basic level of interpersonal intelligence could
yield the intended result.83 Asking indirect questions, such as
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84. See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-15 (Ct. App. 1981)
(wherein the trial judge rejected defense counsel’s request to ask
jurors directly about their sexual orientations; all examples pro-
vided are actual questions used by White’s attorneys).
85. Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors
Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 243 (2011).
86. “The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
87. Young, supra note 85, at 264. 
88. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995).
89. Id. at 267.
90. Young, supra note 85, at 268.
91. People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1990).
92. Young, supra note 85, at 269.
whether the particular juror
has any gay friends or rela-
tives, is active in any LGBT
advocacy groups, has a room-
mate and what that room-
mate’s occupation is (phrased
as “his or her”) might elicit
enough information for an
interested party to draw an
inference that the prospective
juror identifies as LGBT.84 It
remains unclear whether
such questioning would be
permissible, and even if it
were, a reviewing court
might very well find a pretextual motive for a party’s peremp-
tory strike based on a cold record. These considerations
demonstrate the difficulty in inquiring about jurors’ sexual
orientation and further demonstrate why using sexual orien-
tation as a proxy for bias is an inappropriate use of the
peremptory challenge.
B. Alternate Approaches
Restricting or Banning the Use of Peremptory Challenges
Legislatures give and legislatures take away, and what
statute creates, statute may destroy. In an article chronicling
the shortcomings of voir dire,85 Kathryne Young discusses
three alternatives that possess their own appeal. The first finds
its basis in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson, which
calls for a total elimination of the peremptory challenge86 by
arguing that peremptories are often based on an attorney’s
hunch or gut feeling and that “a thin line exists between a
stereotype and a hunch.”87 Further, echoing the Marshall con-
currence, the essential hurdle for an attorney exercising a
racially motivated peremptory strike is the creative hurdle nec-
essary to articulate a racially neutral basis for the strike. Justice
Marshall’s concern may be somewhat lessened by the more
recent developments in the law curtailing a trial-court’s iron-
clad discretion in making credibility determinations; however,
the door remains open for discriminatory use.  Another argu-
ment for eliminating peremptories suggests that peremptories
are superfluous if the system regulating challenges for cause
works as intended.88 For-cause challenges work as intended
when they exclude jurors incapable of impartiality or fairness,
thereby rendering the peremptory challenge unnecessary.
Despite these concerns, a total elimination of the peremptory
seems unlikely. Besides the difficulty in getting Congress and
the state legislatures to reverse centuries of legal precedent,
there is a fairness argument to be made for peremptories.
“Empirical evidence indicates that people are most likely to
perceive that a system is fair when they believe that the proce-
dures it follows are fair,”89 and the peremptory-challenge sys-
tem creates (at least the illusion of) fairness. 
Young proposes two additional methods of curtailing the
use of peremptories for discriminatory purposes by further
restricting the number of challenges allotted and by requiring
parties to give a reason for each peremptory challenge they
exercise.90 Her argument essentially suggests that a limited
number of peremptories would force the court to exercise more
for-cause challenges. This approach seems like a shortcut to
totally eliminating the peremptory altogether. For example,
the federal civil system permits parties only three strikes per
side. To reduce that number to one or two seems arbitrary
when the same level of resource commitment could completely
end the problem by completely ending peremptories. Her sec-
ond proposal has merit. By forcing the parties to articulate a
reason for each of their peremptory strikes, Young’s proposal
short-circuits the Batson challenge by assuming steps one and
two sua sponte and jumping right to step three (sort of): 
An example of the way this proposal might operate is
illustrated in the New York case People v. Green.91 There,
an attorney used a peremptory challenge against a deaf
juror. The trial judge asked about the reason for the
strike, and the attorney replied that it was because of the
juror’s deafness, not because of any doubt that the juror
would be able to communicate through a translator. The
court held that the peremptory challenge violated the
juror’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.
Even though people with disabilities are not a suspect
class, they receive rational [basis] review, and a person’s
disability bears no rational relation to her abilities to
serve as a juror.92
While every trial court might not react in the same way as
the one in Green, requiring parties to disclose their reasons for
exercising peremptories would go a long way in eliminating all
types of impermissible discrimination, including sexual orien-
tation.
Bifurcated Voir Dire
As was previously discussed, the Sixth Amendment requires
speedy, fair, and publicly accessible trials; therefore, all court
proceedings including voir dire need to be publicly accessible.
An effective way to remain within the letter and spirit of the
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93. Personal Anecdote: In my courtroom, the general/individual voir
dire process is simply a matter of respecting the privacy of the
venirepersons. Based on my experience, most people presenting
themselves for jury duty strive to be as truthful as possible (espe-
cially about not wanting to be there). For example, the judge usu-
ally explains that the questions are of a general nature so that the
court and the parties can get an idea of what the panel’s ideas are
on particular issues. This way, the court is not asking jurors to
reveal any personal information in the presence of total strangers.
94. As was the case with Juror B in SmithKline.
95. Personal Anecdote: In my experiences, jurors—when not wholly
confused—will answer the question they think is being asked.
The best example is one of analogy: where a question might ask
“would you mind if I borrowed your pencil?” the juror might
answer “yes,” meaning “you can borrow my pencil.” These dis-
crepancies between a juror’s answer and intended answer are
almost always resolved during individual voir dire.
96. Dale Larsen, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for
Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3
DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139 (2010).
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 160.
100. Id. (quoting Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Arbitrary Metrics in
Psychology, 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 27, 32 (2006)).
101. Larsen’s article omits this consideration.
law is to split voir dire into two components: general and indi-
vidual voir dire. During general voir dire, the court or attor-
neys ask a series of yes-or-no questions in open court in the
presence of the venire. Each juror has an opportunity to
answer without fear of revealing any deeply personal or private
information so publicly.93 Any personal or more probing ques-
tions requiring more than a yes or no are conducted in camera
in a more private setting with only the judge, attorneys, and
court reporter present. Proceedings conducted in camera,
while secluded, are still part of the public record and thus sus-
ceptible to public scrutiny, thereby fulfilling the dual goals of
juror privacy and public openness. Further, proceedings con-
ducted in camera provide the court an opportunity to preserve
some level of confidentiality in jurors’ responses by referring to
them by their juror number, initials, or a letter.94
Some have suggested an alternative method of soliciting pri-
vate information from jurors through the use of Supplemental
Jury Questionnaires (SJQs). While these devices are attractive
in the abstract, they present their own set of challenges. First,
jurors have to understand the questions being asked. It is easy
to overlook the level of familiarity legal practitioners have with
the mechanics of trial process. The questions asked, while
reflective of and sensitive to the law, are often times too com-
plex for a layperson’s understanding. Even those jurors with
the dubious benefit of having seen a police or legal procedural
television show are left puzzled by the questions presented on
the standard jury questionnaire created by an impartial court,
let alone those questions submitted by zealous advocates for
their clients.95
The Implicit Association Test
One scholar argues for the inclusion of a test that measures
prospective jurors’ cognitive responses to stimuli during the
jury-selection process. Attorney Dale Larsen, in a 2010 law
review article,96 asserted the novelty of including the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) during voir dire to measure the degree to
which potential jurors might be racially biased. Developed in the
late 1990s, the IAT measures a person’s response time to certain
stimuli, which its proponents claim measures the implicit atti-
tude (or implicit stereotype) of the subject. For example, the test
subject is asked to associate two pairings, often a black face and
a white face, with words like “good” and “bad.” The IAT then
measures how long—usually in milliseconds—it takes the test
subject to pair the words with the visual stimuli. The thinking
goes that the shorter the
response time, the lesser the
degree of bias. Larsen provides
an excellent explanation: “If
an examinee associates white
faces with positive words more
quickly than black faces, then
that examinee likely has a
closer implicit attitudinal
association between whites
and positive thoughts than
blacks and positive thoughts, thus, indicating an implicit bias in
favor of whites.”97
While this option seems relatively attractive given its quan-
titative measurements, research into IAT’s applicability outside
of the racial context remains unproven despite over 250 IAT-
related studies since 2006.98 The heaviest considerations
weighing against adoption of IAT—aside from non-racial
applicability—are those presented by IAT’s detractors, which
include the test’s cost and various equity considerations. First,
they assert that the test uses measurements with little real-
world value. The argument goes that the millisecond offers vir-
tually no indication of “actual attitudinal preference”99 and
that it is “dangerous . . . to examine a person’s IAT score and
‘imbue [those] values with meaning’ about the individual’s
implicit cognition.”100
Second, administering the IAT requires a significant invest-
ment of financial and professional resources in ensuring the
test is conducted properly and measuring jurors’ responses
accurately. To maintain impartiality in the proceedings, one
assumes that the court system must bear the burden of admin-
istering the test.101 Given the ever-present threat of budget cuts
and the pressing needs already thrust upon an overburdened
court system, it is highly unlikely that courts will squander
scarce resources on a system with limited applicability and
questionable accuracy in determining whether jurors are
implicitly biased on account of race, particularly when the
existing jury-selection process provides opportunities to ferret
out such bias.
The Group-Dynamics Model
Juries are groups of 8 to 12 people who, over the course of
a trial, become intimate (metaphorically) with each other and
then deliberate in secret. Voir dire is an individual examination
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102. Tracy L. Treger, One Jury Indivisible: A Group Dynamics Approach
to Voir Dire, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549 (1992).
103. Id. at 575-76.
104. See Walks v. State, 167 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1936); McGuire v.
Richard Guthmann Transfer Co., 84 N.E. 723 (Ill. 1908).
105. Temperly v. Sarrington’s Admin., 293 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Ky.
1956); State v. Boyer, 112 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. 1938); State v.
Morgan, 73 P.2d 745, 747 (Wash. 1937).
106.  Luvera, supra note 20, at 11.
of total strangers in open court designed to elicit bias from jury
venirepersons. While these considerations are of paramount
importance during voir dire, juries—once selected—complete
their deliberations as a group in secret. Thus, considerations
into how the jury will operate—the jury’s group dynamics—
should factor into the selection process. One author102 sum-
marized the limitations of voir dire and the importance of see-
ing group dynamics this way: 
First, there is a difficulty in predicting the way in
which the jurors will react to one another. This may be
stated as an inquiry into the group’s basic assumptions.
The voir dire examination simply cannot provide enough
of the information necessary to assess jurors’ attitudes
outside of the scope of the issues at trial. The second
dilemma is the difficulty in predicting the power struc-
ture of the jury—what roles each individual will play.
This includes determining who will be leaders, who will
be strong dissenters, and who will sit idly by, contribut-
ing little to the deliberations. The effect of this inability
to predict either the basic assumptions or the group
power structure is that the lawyers have little control over
the work group—the aspect of deliberations focusing on
arriving at a verdict. The inevitability of this result sug-
gests that an extensive voir dire will not provide signifi-
cantly more insight into jury dynamics than a shorter,
more tailored inquiry. Belaboring the jury selection
process, therefore, has a high economic cost with few
social benefits.103
The Group Dynamics Approach offers a promising, innova-
tive approach to the jury-selection process; however, to date,
inquiries into how jurors may act in a group setting are either
prohibited104 or limited in scope.105 Ultimately, voir dire
should be strictly limited to discerning which jurors are inca-
pable of being impartial. Trying to win a given case during voir
dire is a fool’s errand,106 resulting in discriminatory behavior
that denies citizens their rights to serve as jurors. 
CONCLUSION
Sexual-orientation discrimination deserves heightened-
scrutiny analysis by the judiciary, and Batson should be
extended to sexual orientation where peremptory strikes are
exercised on that basis. First, staying true to the principles and
purpose of voir dire requires that litigants impanel fair and
impartial juries. Their use of peremptory challenges should
reflect legitimate concerns based on stated bases for bias—not
using stereotypes as proxies for that bias. The test articulated
in Batson provides an adequate net to ensnare the improper use
of stereotypes and innuendo as proxies for bias, and its protec-
tions should be extended to cover discrimination based upon
sexual orientation. Given the history of discrimination and
violence perpetrated against LGBT individuals, the community
warrants the protections afforded under Batson. While practi-
cal considerations may weigh against the inclusion of sexual
orientation as a protected characteristic under Batson, the
resulting harm would leave gays and lesbians excluded from
this country’s most cherished public institution: service on the
petit jury. The ruling in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories is a promising development in this area, and one
hopes that the Supreme Court resolves the discrepancy among
the circuits in favor of a more perfect, more inclusive union.
Until then, courts must strive to improve their voir dire proce-
dures to protect the rights of all who enter their courtrooms—
regardless of who they are or who they love.
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VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M. CLARKE,
REIMAGINING COURTS: A DESIGN FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Temple Univer-
sity Press, 2015. 215 pp. ($64.50). 
Two long-time National Center for
State Courts executives have set out their
recommendations for redesigning and
improving courts in Reimagining Courts.
The authors are Victor E. Flango, who
recently retired as Executive Director of
Program Resource Development, and
Thomas M. Clarke, the Vice President for
Research and Technology.
Flango and Clarke identify three key
themes that tie their suggested reforms
together: (1) a strong customer focus; (2)
increased access to justice; and (3) more
efficient delivery of services to litigants
and other court stakeholders. They argue
for such things as “building court ser-
vices around the needs of court cus-
tomers by using measurable standards to
ensure that those services actually
improve.” One way to implement such a
goal is through the National Center’s
“High Performance Court Framework”
(see http://goo.gl/WfjjtE). They also note
that greater focus on court customers has
a valuable payoff in treating parties with
respect and dignity, a key ingredient in
procedural justice.
The bulk of the book is devoted to a
discussion of how cases are processed
through courts and the different func-
tions courts play—adjudicating adversar-
ial disputes, expeditiously disposing of
cases that must be resolved quickly,
administrative resolution of cases with
largely undisputed facts, and individual-
ized (or problem-solving) justice where a
person’s treatment needs predominate.
The authors suggest that cases proceed in
different ways through the court system
depending upon whether the main need
is for an adversarial trial or something
else. Whether one agrees with every pro-
posal or not, Flango and Clarke provide
an overview of how things are done today
and how courts might change in ways
that could provide better results, better
service, and better customer satisfaction.
The book also includes a comprehensive
bibliography; anyone interested in court
improvement would be well served by
reading the book and then following up
with further readings from those cited in
the bibliography.
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Modern political campaigning is
examined with a judicial twist in the new
book by Michigan State University politi-
cal science professor Melinda Gann Hall.
Hall presents findings from a study inves-
tigating the effect of television advertis-
ing on both the votes garnered by state
supreme court justices and the overall
likelihood that voters will cast ballots.
Her historical review of state supreme
court elections targets the increasing
power of state supreme courts, the
unique American nature of judicial elec-
tions, and the general negativity and
attack advertising that is endemic in
modern political campaigns. These three
forces robustly combine to make this
book an absorbing and important read for
anyone interested in the courts, advertis-
ing, or political campaigns. 
Hall relies on two data sources for her
empirical enquiry: state supreme court
election data for a 20-year period and sto-
ryboards for the campaign advertise-
ments. There are plenty of details about
the data for those interested in seeing
behind the statistics and plenty of clearly
delineated explanations for those not as
interested in the math behind her find-
ings. Empirically contradicting some of
the conventional beliefs about attack
advertising and campaigns, Hall’s work
should calm concerns about our modern
judicial-selection process and provide
solutions to some relevant issues. 
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In 2013, the International Institute for
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resulted in a special journal issue with 12
articles offering international perspec-
tives on evaluating judges. The articles
(a) consider conceptual and methodolog-
ical issues basic to judicial evaluations,
(b) describe the experiences of senior
judges in Australia, Germany, Sweden,
and the U.S. as evaluators and subjects of
evaluation, and (c) report new research
related to the judicial-evaluation process. 
We would note two articles of special
interest. National Center for State Courts
researcher David Rottman and Yale law
professor Tom Tyler review in detail the
data confirming that the public places the
greatest importance on whether a judge
meets public expectations of procedural
fairness. They examine how that may
best be made part of judicial evaluations.
Rottman and another National Center for
State Courts Researcher, Jennifer Elek,
look at the problem of bias in judicial-
performance evaluations. They cite
research confirming that some survey
methods are systematically biased and
discuss ways to mitigate against bias. Any
judge who wants to evaluate his or her
own performance could benefit from
thinking through the issues discussed in
these articles.
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